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THE WAR

AND ITS COST

WHO SHOULD PAY?

LETTERS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

BY

THE RIGHT HON. SIR WM. MARRIOTT, K.C.

BRIEF

DTB

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LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1901

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BY

THE RIGHT HON. SIR WM. MARRIOTT, K.C.

LATE M.P. FOR BRIGHTON

AND JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, 1885-1892

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
LONDON:

ARGUS PRINTING COMPANY, LIMITED

1901

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brief
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CHAPTER I.

THE SUBJECT INTRODUCED—OUR EARLY MISTAKES.

TAXATION without representation was the rock upon which Great Britain split when she lost her American Colonies, and ancient Whigs and modern Liberals have never ceased to hold up to abuse and scorn the memory of Lord North for his having acted upon so unconstitutional a principle. Yet now, strange to say, one of the ablest members of the Liberal Party and its would-be leader, Sir William Harcourt, is found to be an ardent advocate for the application of this self-same dangerous and pernicious principle to the newly-acquired territories of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. If he had any real authority to speak on behalf of the Liberal Party the breach between it and the Colonials, initiated under Mr. Gladstone's *régime*, would be widened indefinitely. The natural tendency of Colonials is to be Liberals. The great majority of them spring from that vast middle class which used to be considered the backbone of the Liberal Party, and the great principles of Liberalism on questions of self-government, religious equality, and the reform of abuses were dear to them. On all home and domestic questions they were, and still are, Liberals; but before all things they are Imperialists, with staunch loyalty to the Crown and fervid devotion to the unity and, if necessary, the expansion of the Empire. They have absolutely, on questions of foreign and colonial policy, nothing in common with Sir William Harcourt and the

Little Englanders. It is fortunate for Liberalism that men like Lord Rosebery, Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Haldane, and others who act with them, belong to the Party; for were it not for these, who are styled Liberal Imperialists, it is certain that the breach between the Party and the Colonials would be irreparable, and the return of the Party to office would be the signal for the disruption of the Empire.

With Mr. Chamberlain, however, at the Colonial Office, and with Lord Milner as High Commissioner, returning with his position much strengthened by the reception he has met with at home, both from the Government and the Liberal Imperialists, the British subjects in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony feel assured that they will not be dealt with unfairly on the subject of taxation. They recognise the fairness as well as the ability of Sir David Barbour's report, and they have a well-founded confidence that no taxation will be imposed upon them till those whom they consider leaders and men of responsibility in the Colony have been consulted by Lord Milner. Their confidence is increased by the publication of the report of the Concessions Commission. It is recognised that the task the Commissioners had to perform was one of great difficulty, and the investigation they had to make necessitated great industry and much patience, besides extreme care in the reception and sifting of evidence; but the report shows that they thoroughly mastered their subject, and its fairness and judicial ability are freely acknowledged on all sides. Even those who may suffer from its conclusions cannot impugn its spirit of fairness.

With regard to taxation, the contention of the Little Englander, put forth by Sir William Harcourt with his

usual ability and by others with much less, rests on the assumption that the present war was undertaken solely in the interests of the British residents in the Transvaal, and that they are responsible for its commencement. The assumption is prompted by jealousy rather than by any attempt of judgment. Allusions to houses in Park Lane and Piccadilly show that even in this enlightened age there are people who are as envious of those who have made money in South Africa as were people in the last century but one of the Nabobs who returned, with what were then considered large fortunes, from India. In these days of boasted altruism this should not be, especially amongst those Liberals who pride themselves upon being more altruistic than their Conservative neighbours. The Nabobs acquired wealth solely for themselves, whereas in the Transvaal, though a few who were first in the field have made enormous fortunes, the general wealth is distributed amongst thousands, or, probably, hundreds of thousands, of shareholders, who only want a remunerative investment for the money they have saved. Why these investors should be the pet aversion of the Little Englanders, and why these latter should be so anxious to mulct them, is a problem of human perversity which it would be difficult to solve.

The assumption is absolutely false in every respect. In the first place, the war, so far from being made solely or specially in the interests of the Uitlanders, was undertaken for the general interests of the British Empire, and especially for those of the Mother Country. The main object of the war was to re-establish and maintain British ascendancy in South Africa, which was dangerously threatened by the Dutch and the pro-Boers, not only in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, but also in Cape Colony and,

to a certain extent, in Natal. Ever since 1872, when responsible government was granted to Cape Colony, the Dutch have utilised parliamentary procedure for the purpose of thwarting and embarrassing the British ; and since 1881, when that fatal peace after the defeat at Majuba was concluded, and 1882, when the Dutch language was placed on the same footing as the English, and was allowed to be used in parliamentary debates and in official documents, the confident illusion of the Dutch has been that the time was not far distant when they would overthrow the ascendancy of Great Britain and re-establish that of their own nation. This fact was known to many Colonials ; but their warnings were little heeded by Governors like Sir Hercules Robinson or Lord Loch, and consequently they received little or no attention from Ministers in Downing Street. Ample proofs now exist of the truth of the contention of the Colonials, and the documents produced before the Concessions Commission may be added to their number. Had the present Government declined to accept the challenge thrown out by President Kruger in October, 1899, or had they since agreed to any ignominious terms of peace, not only would Great Britain have lost her South African Colonies, but the whole British Empire would have received such a jar that its disruption would only have been a matter of time ; and the time would have been near at hand. The significance of this fact was thoroughly understood by His Majesty's present Ministry, and it cannot fail to be duly recognised when the adjustment of taxation for the cost of the war is under consideration.

The responsibility for the war in no way can be said to rest with the British residents in South Africa. Its sole cause was the policy pursued by the Mother Country for the

last seventy years, and the responsibility is entirely hers. It commenced with Lord Glenelg, in 1835. He was then Colonial Secretary, and his unstatesmanlike conduct in dealing with the native question, in opposition to the statesmanlike views of the then Governor (Sir Benjamin d'Urban) and the majority of the Colonists, and in subservience to the influence of Dr. Philip and a small party attached to him, who desired the formation of States ruled by Bantu Chiefs under the guidance of missionaries, and from which Europeans not favoured by missionaries should be excluded, was the cause of the first great Boer trek towards the Transvaal, in the year 1836. The Dutch inhabitants of the colony knew that they were "Europeans, not favoured by missionaries," and they trekked to avoid religious persecution, as their ancestors had quitted Europe for the same reason two centuries before. Amongst the trekkers was President Kruger, then a boy of thirteen years of age; and the reminiscences of that trek, and the tales of British tyranny he must have heard during it, implanted in him that hatred of Great Britain which has ever since been his distinguishing characteristic. Had this trek never been rendered necessary it may be said with some confidence that there never would have been the present war.

The granting of responsible government, in 1872, to Cape Colony was entirely in accordance with Liberal principles, and it was granted from the best of motives and with the best intentions on the part of Ministers then in power; but subsequent events have proved that its concession was premature, and, considering the acuteness of the racial question in South Africa, it would have been more prudent if Lord Kimberley, who was Colonial Secretary in Mr. Gladstone's Government of the time, had postponed it and given

it in a more modified form. Its grant has undoubtedly proved a cause of unrest in the Colony; but it is doubtful whether this would ever have assumed dangerous proportions had it not been for the fatuous and ignoble policy pursued by the Gladstone Ministry between 1880 and 1885.

The recall of Sir Bartle Frere; the peace made after the Majuba disaster—not from any feeling of magnanimity, as Mr. Gladstone pretended at the time, but from fear of a rising in Cape Colony, as Lord Kimberley has since confessed; the restoration of the use of the Dutch language; and the giving up to Germany of Angra Pequena, the historic spot first reached by Bartholomew Diaz in 1486, when for the first time Christian feet trod the soil of South Africa, and which Germany, in 1884, wanted, not for the sake of the desert lands with which it is surrounded, but for the purpose of obtaining a foothold for future operations, were considered by the Dutch and the Boers conclusive proofs of British weakness and cowardice. Hence the dream of the Dutch that Great Britain could be browbeaten and coerced with impunity, and that eventually she could be ousted from her position of paramountcy in South Africa. As for the Jameson Raid, it was in no way a cause of the war, though it must be admitted it was an untoward incident in the series of events which preceded it. Its object was the same in principle as that for which Great Britain is now fighting; but the mode of obtaining the object was worthy of condemnation in more respects than one.

In considering upon whose shoulders the responsibility for the war rests it must always be borne in mind that the policy of Downing Street which caused it was invariably carried out contrary to the advice of the Colonists, and in spite of their warnings and protests. The policy of Lord

Glenelg in 1835 and that of Lord Derby, as Colonial Minister in Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet of 1880-85, were most distasteful to the Colonials, and produced keen and bitter opposition. The policy of Lord Kimberley in 1872 met, naturally enough, with the approval of the majority; for the bait of self-government is tempting to all self-respecting communities. The boon was very popular with both the British and the Dutch inhabitants of Cape Colony, and, though recently an agitation has been simmering for its suspension, there is no reason to think that it represents the views of the majority of the electors. If it does, they can easily carry out their wishes, by electing a majority of members who will pray the Mother Country for their own extinction. Though the present Assembly has given just cause of complaint on account of its laxity and want of foresight, and of its toleration of the disloyal speeches of certain of its members, it cannot be said to be responsible for the war or its conduct. That belongs to the Mother Country; and with her present Ministers there is no probability of her being so undignified as to disclaim it.

Before leaving the question of responsibility for the war, one other fact may be noted for which the Mother Country is solely responsible. Had the Ministers of Great Britain acted differently from what they did, and had they followed the advice of British subjects in South Africa, it is almost a certainty that this war would not have occurred. The question is not a party one; for both Liberal and Conservative Administrations lost the opportunities which offered themselves while they were in power. Delagoa Bay would have been in the possession or under the control of Great Britain if it had not been for the want of foresight and decision on the part of British Ministers. Had this been

the case, there are two reasons which would have made the war very improbable, if not impossible. In the first place, President Kruger would never have indulged in his dream of becoming a sea Power. His anxiety for a port on the Indian Ocean was as strong as that of Russia for one in the China Seas, and he would have given anything to possess Delagoa Bay. Failing that, he would have been content with a much inferior one; and shortly before the war his Government had concluded an agreement for land in Tongoland, which they hoped would enable them to get possession of Kosi Bay. Great Britain at Delagoa Bay would have rendered any such hope impossible. The second reason is of much more importance; for had Delagoa Bay been under British control the Boers could never have got possession of the arms they have used against us in the present war. In 1897 no less than 147,000 rifles passed through Delagoa Bay to the Transvaal, in addition to the big guns which proved so useful to the Boers and so disastrous to our troops. The Foreign Office knew of this, and though, by treaty with Portugal, these importations could have been stopped, the official supineness which in former days prevented us acquiring the Bay now neglected to interfere.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR—MILITARY BLUNDERS.

IF the South African Colonials cannot be held responsible for the commencement of the war, neither can they be for its conduct or its costliness. Upon what individual, or upon what body of individuals, rests the responsibility for the conduct of the war it is impossible to say. The organisation of the War Office was so cunningly devised that the chief object it attained was to make nobody responsible for anything. The most bitter Anglophobe could not condemn it in stronger language than have the Commissioners appointed by Mr. Brodrick. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the Army Reform Bill which he somewhat prematurely introduced in the House of Commons, his courage in laying bare the inefficiency of the Office over which he presides is deserving of all praise. Responsible Ministers are generally very chary of exposing the deficiencies of the permanent officials under them, and, either from kindliness of heart or a love of comfortable repose, are too apt to wink at and pass over delinquencies, even though they may be injurious to the public service. Mr. Brodrick has not yielded to this temptation; but, recognising the evils which existed, he has done his best to get at the root of the matter with regard to their causes, and for so doing he deserves the gratitude of his countrymen.

A reformed War Office may prevent evils in the future ; but it is certain that the unreformed War Office is chiefly answerable for the disastrous and wasteful conduct of the present campaign, and in no way can the Colonials be held responsible for it. On the contrary, had their opinions been invited, or had their advice, when volunteered, been listened to, it seems a certainty that peace would have been made twelve months ago, and that the cost of the war would have been a third of what it is at present. It is a fact which cannot be gainsaid that not only was Colonial opinion not asked for by the War Office, or by the Generals whom they appointed, but that, also, when Colonial advice was offered it was rejected. Ever since Great Britain has held Colonies in South Africa there have been constant fights with the Dutch, the Boers, and the Kaffirs, and thousands of the Colonials have taken part in them, and it is acknowledged they did their work well. Their experience would have been invaluable ; but advantage was never taken of it. Their knowledge of the country and of the enemy opposed to us, of their mode of fighting, and of the class of troops best adapted to deal with them, and of the kind of horses required, as well as of the contracts for supplies which should be made, must necessarily have been far greater than that of any of the officials at the War Office, or of the Generals who were appointed to take the field. Common sense would have suggested a utilisation of this knowledge and experience at the very first contemplation of hostilities ; but common sense appears to have been an unknown quantity at the War Office : opinions were not invited, and a deaf ear was turned to all the advice and suggestions which were voluntarily offered. Had they been acted upon there would have been no telegram about

"Infantry preferred," no horses from Argentina, no extravagant contracts for food and its conveyance, no frontal attacks against impregnable positions; but there would have been infinitely fewer cases of soldiers falling into traps and being taken prisoners, and in all human probability the war would have been finished long ago, and peace would have been re-established, and business and commerce flourishing under the pure and stable administration which would have been established under the auspices of Lord Milner.

What makes disappointment doubly keen is the knowledge that the quality of the Army has been so good, and that all the disasters have been due to misdirection. The troops and their officers have fully sustained the high character the British Infantry earned in the days of the Duke of Wellington. Their bravery, their endurance under fatigue and hardships, and their kindly and good behaviour to such Boers as were defeated and taken prisoners, have been unrivalled. Had they been fighting in Europe, according to the rules of the "kriegspiel," they would have earned immortal laurels; and there can be no doubt that the foreign attachés who accompanied them fully realised their value in European warfare, and have reported to their Governments accordingly. The pity was that they were expected to do impossibilities, and so were often led to disaster and useless slaughter. The responsibility rested with the Generals and their Staffs.

It may seem ungracious to criticise the action of soldiers like Lord Roberts, Sir Redvers Buller, and others who in the past have rendered great services to their country, and who have never hesitated to risk their lives in her cause; and nothing would justify such criticism except its neces-

sity for the public good. In addition to many other great military qualifications, both Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller possess one of inestimable value, viz., consideration for the condition and even the comforts of the soldiers under their command. They are consequently both very popular in the Army, and Sir Redvers is equally popular amongst all the people of Natal. Notwithstanding the hostile criticisms which have been passed upon certain of his actions, his general behaviour, his dogged perseverance till Natal was freed from the presence of the Boers, and his subsequent successful march to Lydenburg, earned for him the admiration and regard of the Natal Colonists. At the same time, it is considered he made a serious mistake in not allowing the pursuit of the Boers after the relief of Ladysmith. Had he done so it is believed that such severe loss would have been inflicted upon them that it is not improbable that they would have been prepared to accept honourable conditions of peace. Of both him and Lord Roberts it can, unfortunately, be said with truth that they returned home without accomplishing the task they were sent out to perform, and that neither of them gauged the situation correctly.

With regard to returning, Sir Redvers was in a different position from Lord Roberts; for he had been superseded, and the task he had been given to do by the Commander-in-Chief, who superseded him, was accomplished. As for Lord Roberts, his three speeches made in Natal and Cape Colony show that he believed his task was completed, and that the war was, as he put it, "practically" over. Subsequent events have proved how entirely he was mistaken, and it does seem probable that if he and Sir Redvers Buller had consulted and paid more heed to Colonial opinion,

they would not have been misled as they undoubtedly were. No Colonial doubts the sincerity of Lord Roberts, or his perfect belief in the truth of what he stated; but they cannot fail to mark the incorrectness of his judgment, and to think that he would not have been so mistaken if he had taken counsel with experienced Colonists who knew the Boer character. While he was telling the public, both in South Africa and at home, that the war was practically over—and his conduct was taken as proof of the genuineness of his belief; for no one dreamt he would leave the Cape till the task imposed upon him by her late Majesty was completed—many who knew the country were saying the war would still last one, if not two, more years; and experience has shown that the Colonials were right and the British General wrong. The pity is they were not consulted.

Lord Roberts's Staff appointments were most unfortunate. To be on the Staff has always been the legitimate ambition of officers who considered their calling a profession, and who accordingly took a deep interest in their work. The Staff College was established with the special object of training officers to become efficient when they received Staff appointments, and it was generally believed that it was a *sine quâ non* to pass through it before such appointments were made. Neither length of service, experience in military matters, having passed through the College, nor any special qualifications for the post seem to have influenced Lord Roberts. Lordly titles apparently had for him an irresistible fascination. Like the Pope's Noble Guard, titular nobility was essential for anyone to be on his Staff. Three dukes of ancient lineage and vast patrimony—the Dukes of Norfolk, Marlborough, and Westminster—in a

spirit of self-sacrifice worthy of their order, volunteered to leave the comforts and luxuries of home to share the dangers and hardships of our soldiers in the field. Though none of the trio had been near the Staff College, nor had ever had any real military experience, they were annexed at once, on their landing in the Cape, by Lord Roberts and added to his Staff. The Duke of Norfolk, with a keener sense of duty, or, perhaps, of the ludicrous, than his two younger compeers, declined to be annexed, and fled from the temptation with an agility worthy of Joseph in his flight from the wife of Potiphar.

These appointments might only have been considered in their ludicrous light had it not been for the evil precedents they have established. Jocularly, it was said that as the Boer Generals had their Field Cornets, Lord Roberts was determined to go one better, and have his Field Coronets. Seriously, it has caused profound discontent amongst the best class of officers in the Army. His apologists admit the gravity of the evil, but they try to palliate the blame by saying that as General he was subject to some malign influence. The British people are given to hero-worship, and Lord Roberts is deservedly one of their heroes; and this very fact makes his present position of Commander-in-Chief the more dangerous. If, during the holding of this exalted post, he is, in making his appointments and bestowing his patronage, to be under the same malign influence as it is said he was in South Africa, and also in India, no Army reform which may be inaugurated will be of the slightest use. No system, however excellent in itself, is of any avail unless properly-qualified individuals be appointed to carry it out. Under the Duke of Cambridge's *régime*, in the matter of appointments there was little jealousy and no

jobbery, and had the Duke of Connaught been appointed his successor the same would have been the case. With competing Generals—each having a set of their own—appointed alternately, there is intense jealousy, and, if not jobbery in the sordid sense of the word, a partiality under malign influences which is almost as dangerous to the public interests.

CHAPTER III.

THE POLICY AFTER PRETORIA—THE NEED FOR A
DIPLOMATIST.

LORD ROBERTS'S strategy, by which he entrapped Cronje and took Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria, as well as indirectly helping the relief of Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, is considered by military experts to have been admirable. All the military attachés of the foreign Powers who accompanied the expedition speak in the highest terms of it. It proved, if proof were needed, that he was a great General. On the occupation of Pretoria his reputation was at its highest, and it is unfortunate that subsequent events have somewhat dimmed its lustre. This was not his fault, but the fault of the system, for which the country and its statesmen are responsible. The view of British Ministers seems to be that if a man can do one thing well he can do everything well. If he be a good general, he must also, of necessity, be a good administrator, diplomatist, or even statesman. In ordinary life it would be just as rational to have clothes made by a cobbler because he makes boots well. History teaches that very few generals have also possessed administrative or statesmanlike abilities. Napoleon, Cromwell, and Julius Cæsar certainly did ; but it is doubtful whether a fourth could be found. The greatest British general of the last century (the

Duke of Wellington) was not a success as a statesman, and his two successors in greatness, as well as in office (Lords Wolseley and Roberts), will be placed in the same category. Because Lord Wolseley had shown himself an able and capable soldier he was appointed, in 1879, to frame a scheme for the government of Zululand after the defeat of Cetewayo; but in four years the scheme absolutely failed. There was no more gallant soldier in the Army than the late Sir Owen Lanyon, and he had military talents of a high order; but when, in 1879, he was appointed the Civil Governor of the Transvaal his conduct in that capacity was such that it hastened, if it did not actually cause, the outbreak of the Boer rebellion. When Lord Roberts entered Pretoria in triumph the general opinion, which he shared, was that the war was over, and that the time for making peace had arrived. Had great military nations like Germany or France been in the position of Great Britain, a well-qualified statesman or diplomatist would have been despatched to arrange the terms. Peace negotiations especially require moderation in manner, great tact, experience, and *savoir faire*, and other qualifications which are not wanted, and are seldom found, in the military caste. In the Danish, Austrian, and Franco-Prussian wars Prince Bismarck always accompanied Count Moltke, and though he never interfered in strictly military matters, the moment the military had accomplished their work, and peace was in sight, he undertook the negotiations. On the part of France, M. Thiers arranged the terms, and not any of the Generals who had been fighting.

It is no disparagement to Lord Roberts or to Lord Kitchener to say that as a statesman, administrator, and diplomatist, Lord Milner is vastly their superior. He is known not

only for high scholarly attainments and great administrative ability, to which neither of them aspires, but he has had the advantage of being in the country for over four years, and during that period he has rightly diagnosed the character of the Dutch and the Boers, and of the Colonials generally, and there can be no doubt that he is the one person who ought to have been despatched to Pretoria to take advantage of Lord Roberts's military successes to bring about peace. Had he been there it is almost a certainty that peace would have been concluded. General Botha had come to Pretoria for the special purpose of making peace. When he asked upon what terms peace would be conceded he was told by Lord Roberts, with soldier-like bluntness, "unconditional surrender." In civilised Europe these terms are understood. Under them private property would be respected, prisoners would be released, and individuals would be subject to no indignities; but the semi-civilised Boer does not comprehend this. He expected that the British would do to him what he would do to the British if they were vanquished. "Unconditional surrender" to him would be interpreted as loss, not merely of national independence, but of individual liberty and property. Had the words "unconditional surrender" not been used, and had the terms which would have been given to the Boers under it been submitted to them, the general opinion of those who ought to know is that they would have been accepted. The two words themselves would be offensive to any high-spirited nation; but to the Boers, who combine a great love of independence and the pride of a land-owning class with great ignorance, they were especially so; and no skilled diplomatist, in dealing with them, would have dreamt of making use of them.

Lord Milner, as Governor of the Cape, though also High Commissioner, was in what may be termed a very ticklish position, and it is doubtful if he could have acted with effect without direct instructions from home. The two words will always remain in that large category of words which had better have been left unsaid, and, instead of peace being made, time was wasted in Pretoria while the Boers were recuperating and making good use of the leisure allowed them. Lord Roberts, left to himself, and with no personal knowledge of the Boers, except what he may have picked up since his arrival in the Cape, blew hot and cold—now too lenient, now too severe; so that when he departed, in December, matters were in a much worse condition than in the previous June, and the task left to Lord Kitchener was rendered far more difficult. During his command Lord Roberts did much to please and conciliate Colonials, whose feathers had not infrequently been ruffled by the conduct of some of the Imperial officers. His marked attention to the Volunteers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa itself had an excellent effect, and nothing pleased these gallant soldiers more than his placing them in the front, in positions of danger and responsibility. His confidence in them produced confidence in him, and, notwithstanding his Staff appointments and his failure to complete his task and make peace, he is as popular with all the Colonials as he is with his countrymen at home. Blame for not concluding peace cannot with justice be attributed to him; for he was placed in a false position by not having at his disposal the tact and experience of some trained diplomatist or of some of the South African Colonials who had lived among and understood the character of the Boers.

CHAPTER IV.

LORD KITCHENER'S TASK — HIS FAILURE AS CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR.

WHETHER Lord Kitchener will follow the example of his two predecessors in the office of Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and leave the country before the work he was appointed to perform is completed, the future alone will show. Up to the present time his record outside South Africa is of the best. He has never had the opportunity of showing whether he is a great strategist, or whether he possesses the abilities of a great General in the field, in the European sense; but it may be said of him, with truth, that whatever he has had to do he has done well. In Egypt he had to retrieve the errors which Great Britain had made in the past, and he did it successfully. In recovering Khartoum and the Soudan, which would never have been lost to Egypt had it not been for the deplorable policy of Mr. Gladstone's Ministry in 1883 and the mistaken subservience to it of the Consul-General then at Cairo, he had, as he would be the first to acknowledge, the most valuable assistance of Sir Francis Wingate, as head of the Intelligence Department, and of officers like Generals Hunter and Rundle in the field; but to him were due the organisation and responsibility of the expedition, and to him belongs the chief credit. He practically made the native army which fought under his orders as Sirdar. He com-

pleted the work commenced by Sir Francis Grenfell, in the organisation of the Egyptian Army, and he, by his skill and patience, converted the squads of fellaheen into real fighting corps ; and at Omdurman they did work creditable to all who had had a hand in training them. In one respect the conduct of the Soudan campaign was unique, and the credit for this uniqueness is due to Lord Kitchener. It was the cheapest campaign ever fought. Had the present campaign been conducted on the same principles, and, perhaps, had its management and equipment been left to Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener, Great Britain would have been the richer by over £100,000,000.

The task he was appointed to perform in November, 1900, was difficult in itself, and its performance was not rendered easier by circumstances for which he, personally, was not responsible. For a month after his appointment his hands were practically tied, and he was obliged to fret in a state of enforced idleness while the Boers were busy taking advantage of the leisure afforded them. The unfortunate cause of this was the regrettable illness of the daughter of Lord Roberts, and, whatever sympathy was rightly felt for the father and the family, the untoward incident should teach the lesson that in future wives and female relatives should not be permitted to accompany Generals, however exalted, to the seat of war. When war is raging, with all its awful scenes of bloodshed and slaughter, all females are out of place, except those who, with self-sacrificing devotion, are present to tend the sick and soothe the dying. There can be no doubt that the arrival of so many ladies in South Africa, and their presence at or near the seat of war, had a demoralising effect. It prevented the seriousness of the situation being grasped

as it ought to have been, and there was a tendency, till defeats and disasters taught a different lesson, to treat war, notwithstanding its horrors, in a light-hearted, drawing-room kind of spirit.

This war has had one distinctive characteristic: if the Soudan War was the cheapest, this has been the most humane. In spite of hostile criticism in the House of Commons, and admitting the truth of most of the facts brought forward by Mr. Burdett-Coutts, never before was there the same provision made for the care and comfort of the sick and wounded of both friends and foe, and in no former war have those in command, regimental officers, and soldiers, acted with more consideration and kindness towards their defeated enemy. Horrible though it may sound in the ears of some of those who have been traducing the characters of our officers and soldiers, the question has arisen whether a good deal of the kindness has not been misplaced. Apparent kindness may be real cruelty. If it prolong war it is so. If sparing the rod spoils the child, so the curtailing of the natural consequences of war to those against whom it is being waged may prolong it, and so add indefinitely to the number of killed and wounded. It is said to have done so in the present war, and the assertion is made by those who knew the Boer character, and it is worthy of consideration. Lord Roberts is, as is well-known, one of the most kind-hearted of men, and on his arrival at Pretoria he did all it was possible to do to lessen the horrors of war and to alleviate any sufferings to which the enemy might be exposed. Amongst other things, it is said that he promised those of the Boers who surrendered that they should not be sent out of the Transvaal, and that their wives and families should be sup-

ported. This kindliness, it is alleged, has produced two evils. In the first place, it has prolonged the war. Those who are acquainted with the Boers and their modes of thought say that one reason why they see no objection to the prolongation of the war is that their wives and families are cared for by the British. It is, unfortunately, true that the number of deaths at the Boer refugee camps has been large, just as they were at Bloemfontein, where fever was raging; but all impartial witnesses will bear testimony to the care that has been taken by the British authorities for the comfort of the Boer refugees; and one of the consequences is that the Boers in the field are perfectly content with the manner in which their relatives are treated. In the second place, it inflicts great suffering upon other refugees whose misfortune is that they are British subjects.

It is reckoned that there are now about 63,000 Boer refugees in the Transvaal being fed and supported by Great Britain. There are about an equal number of British refugees on the coast. These people have endured great privations and suffering, and have met with scant sympathy compared with the more fortunate Boers. They are burning to return to Johannesburg. They want to work. They hate their enforced idleness, and they want to add to their meagre means. They are not capitalists, as all Little Englanders seem to think, but clerks and artizans. The sole reason alleged why they may not return is that so much food is required for the 63,000 Boers in the refugee camps that there would be no food for them. They naturally ask, Why are the disloyalists to be fed and kept for nothing by the British Government, and we, who are loyal, are kept away, and prevented from working and feeding ourselves? The answer is, "Lord Roberts's kindly promise at Pre-

toria"; and it is said Lord Kitchener is bound by it. In whatever terms this alleged promise was made, it cannot be eternally binding. Unless peace is quickly concluded it will be absolutely necessary that notice should be given to the Boer leaders that either they must support their own people or that these latter must be sent to the coast. To keep the loyalists there and to pamper the disloyalists here is a premium upon disloyalty. Lord Kitchener is in no way responsible for the presence of these refugees in their camps. It was one of the legacies he inherited from his predecessor, and there can be no doubt that it has hampered him and increased his difficulties.

The Colonials are naturally very tired of a war which they think, if it had been properly conducted, should have been finished long ago; but they do not attach blame to Lord Kitchener for this. They recognise the difficulties he has to contend with and though he has been in command eight months, they are patiently waiting, in faith that eventually he will be successful. At the same time it cannot be said that he is popular in the sense that Sir Redvers Buller and Lord Roberts were. Both the latter were personally very popular; but Lord Kitchener is not. He has made two mistakes which were enough, of themselves, to make him unpopular with British subjects in the Colony. In the first place, he not only took away the soldiers who were guarding the mines, but when remonstrated with he declared bluntly that it was not his business to guard the mines. It is difficult to conceive now he could be betrayed into making so foolish a statement. If one of the duties of the Army is not to protect property, the taxpayer may naturally ask, why does he pay taxes to support the Army? He is constantly told that his tax is

only a contribution towards the insurance of his property ; but if those who are paid out of it say that it is not their business to defend the insurer's property, he may well be bewildered. Lord Kitchener's act in withdrawing the soldiers from guarding the mines was wrong in itself, and his declaration afterwards made the matter worse. While he was publishing his callous views on the defence of property, the Government, whose servant he was, were ascertaining the value of the property by means of a Special Commissioner (Sir David Barbour), with a view to taxation to support the costs of the war. No commentary could be more condemnatory of his actions and sayings than this act of his own Government. His second mistake was his attempt to make peace with General Botha. The terms which he would have accepted had it not been for the intervention of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner would simply have been ruinous to the country. Peace at any price is a dangerous doctrine, as it means a peace easily purchased and equally easily broken. Had the terms approved by Lord Kitchener been adopted, there can be no doubt that the peace concluded would only have been temporary, and the last state of South Africa would have been worst than the first.

It cannot be said with truth that Lord Kitchener has increased his reputation by acting as High Commissioner in Lord Milner's absence. The two experiments tried in South Africa of appointing military men to high civil positions have not proved successful. There is no more highly-educated man in the British Army than Sir William Butler, and from his extensive reading and knowledge of the world it would have been thought that he was perfectly qualified to carry on the civil Government of his country.

Yet, when Sir Alfred Milner made his first visit to England, and left General Butler to act as Governor and High Commissioner in his absence, he reversed Sir Alfred's policy, and showed favour to the Bond and alienated the loyalists. Lord Kitchener has followed in his footsteps in reversing Lord Milner's policy in the Transvaal, and especially in Pretoria and Johannesburg. When Sir Alfred Milner was resident here everything was going smoothly, and the civilians went about their business in peace and comfort. Since his departure all has changed, and the civilians are cursing their fate at having to live under the rule of the British Government as represented by the acting High Commissioner, Lord Kitchener. Strange as it may sound, many are actually pining for the good old days of Kruger Government, and they say they prefer Krugerism to Kitchenerism, and that Kruger and his Z.A.R.P. interfered with personal liberty far less than Kitchener and the Egyptian officials with whom he is surrounded. How far Lord Kitchener is responsible for the inconvenience which civilians now have to put up with it is difficult to say. The cause may be the over-zeal of those acting under him. It is a curious coincidence, but men of the sword appear to have a childlike faith in pen, ink, and paper; their belief in their potency is much stronger than that possessed by literary men, journalists, or lawyers. When in civil capacities they seem to be oppressed with the dangerous idea that "something must be done," and they have recourse to passes, permits, and all kinds of literary devices for curbing the free action of citizens. As for having any effect upon the Boers, and preventing them from doing mischief, they are about as potent as passports used to be for keeping conspirators out of the European countries they wished

to enter: they are absolutely useless. The issuing of all these paper documents gives military men a lot of work they cordially dislike, and their result is to inconvenience and irritate the loyal portion of the population, while they have no deterrent effect upon the disloyal.

One absurd rule introduced since Lord Milner departed is to compel all people except certain privileged individuals to be indoors by ten o'clock. The rule was adopted because it was discovered that some Boers had entered the town at eleven o'clock one night. A rule to compel everybody to be in after dark would be intelligible, however disagreeable; but the arbitrary fixing upon the hour of ten p.m. is inexplicable. Excepting privileged individuals is invidious. All Imperial officers in uniform and officials holding certain appointments are exempt. The Volunteer forces are not included in the exemption, and hence a friction and jealousy between the Imperial and Volunteer forces, which is injurious to both, and is much to be deprecated. The rule is absolutely inoperative for keeping out undesirable Boers. If these want to enter the town they have only to don an officer's khaki, and they can pass easily. But even this precaution is for them unnecessary. There are many places where they can approach unobserved, and they are far too slim to be caught by the M.P.'s, or Military Police, with these imposing letters upon their cuffs. Up to a certain hour a good many of these improvised policemen are to be seen; but after twelve you may walk for miles and not meet one. They stick to certain spots, which it may be quite certain no hostile Boer will approach. In time of war the proclamation of martial law is an absolute necessity, and its proclamation has done much good in many parts of Africa;

but the aim of those acting under it should be to interfere as little as possible with the habits or convenience of the ordinary civilian, as is done at Kimberley under General Sir George Pretyman, at Bulawayo under Colonel Vernon, and as was done here in Johannesburg till Lord Milner went home. The same cannot be said of Lord Kitchener and his Staff. The excuse made for them is that they have been accustomed to deal with the fellaheen of Egypt, and they have not yet had time to distinguish between them and British citizens; but the excuse does not recommend itself to these latter. They are praying for the return of Lord Milner, when they hope to see civil government re-established and the military placed in the same position with regard to it as they hold in the Mother Country.

CHAPTER V.

THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA—THE TREATMENT OF
COLONIAL TROOPS.

IN considering the amount the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony ought to contribute directly in taxation for the purposes of paying the expenses caused by the war, consideration should be given to the amount the Mother Country gains indirectly by her connection with the daughter colonies. Direct taxation affecting the subjects in these colonies alone will practically be impossible. If Sir David Barbour's suggestion is acted upon, and 10 per cent. is placed upon mining profits, British shareholders living at home will be the chief sufferers. Whatever they may pay in income-tax will be in addition to the 10 per cent., and they will probably find themselves mulcted to the tune of 16 to 18 per cent. when both are exacted. Taxes on licenses and the value of property belonging to the late Republican Government, and which will now by right of conquest belong to the British Government, may legitimately and beneficially be utilised for the payment of war costs. Though the cost of the war must be great, and unnecessarily great, in consequence of the incompetence of those appointed by Great Britain to carry it on, still, when it is over, the Mother Country's gain will be very large. The more prosperous South Africa, the more prosperous must Great Britain be. The development

of the one must increase enormously the wealth of the other, and this development has only just commenced. In travelling through South Africa from Cape Town to Bulawayo, and onward to the Zambesi, and knowing the mineral wealth of the country in gold, in diamonds, in copper, and in coal, and in observing the fine pasturage for cattle, and the scope for farming and agriculture, the uppermost thought constantly in the mind is, Why do these 1,600,000 square miles of land possess a white population of less than 1,000,000 of people? Rhodesia alone covers 750,000 square miles, and its white population is only a little over 10,000. The coloured population only amounts to about 4,000,000 throughout the whole of South Africa. Here is territory which, if properly developed and cultivated, might support a population of 100,000,000, while now it supports less than a twentieth of that number.

Ignorance of her climate and her capabilities is probably the reason why South Africa has been so neglected in the past. It is now known that her climate is superb. Along the coast in Cape Colony and in Natal it is better than the climates of most countries; but on the high tableland which stretches from Majesfontein to the Zambesi it is unrivalled for its vigorous and health-giving qualities. Of course, there are some drawbacks. In some places malarial fevers are prevalent; but these are yielding to treatment, and disappearing as civilisation advances. There are mosquitoes and locusts; but these plagues can be overcome. Notwithstanding these, there is less sickness than there is in Europe. The climate is admirably adapted for Europeans, and those which have been born here grow up strong and healthy, and certainly taller than the majority of

Englishmen. It was of Ceylon that it was originally said that "only man is vile," and it may now be asserted with equal truth of South Africa that human neglect and human misgovernment are the causes of the country's backwardness in comparison with the other three continents. With good government and honest and just administration it will become a most prosperous and wealthy country, and the gainers will not merely be those who come and settle here, but the old countries which supply their wants. Great Britain ought to be the greatest gainer, and the working classes should benefit chiefly. Not only does the vast and costly machinery which is required to work the mines come from Great Britain—from Glasgow, Newcastle, Manchester, and Birmingham—but also the materials out of which the clothes of the inhabitants are made. The demand for clothing material is sure to increase; for the coloured people are taking to it rapidly, and the cotton and woollen goods with which they now cover and adorn their formerly naked bodies are all made in the mills and factories of Yorkshire and Lancashire. If the Little Englanders had their way the working classes of these counties would be the chief losers.

The present Prime Minister of England has often pointed out that the great desiderata of the working classes were regular work and good wages, and that these could only be maintained by finding markets for the goods they produce; and while these latter were kept out of many countries by prohibitive protection duties, the colonies were open to them. South Africa will be one of the best, if not eventually the best market for goods manufactured in England and Scotland. Under the corrupt and very unbusinesslike government of President Kruger the Transvaal mines pro-

duced £16,000,000 the year before the war, and the greater part of this sum—70 per cent., it is said—was spent in Great Britain. It is anticipated that the output of gold will be doubled and trebled, and perhaps even quadrupled, under sound and just government, and the working classes of the United Kingdom will reap the benefit. Costly as the war has been, an asset has been gained which will far more than pay for the money spent. All that is wanted is good administration. At present matters are at a standstill. To walk through the engine-houses of the different mines, and see the magnificent machinery, which has cost millions of money, all standing idle, and producing nothing, is melancholy in the extreme. For nearly two years their powers of beneficial production have been paralysed, and the world has lost accordingly. Of the 120 mines in the Transvaal, all are idle except seven, and these seven are only producing a quarter of what they could. Each of them has 200 stamps, and only 50 of them can be worked. Out of the 5,000 stamps in the country only 350 are at work. Each stamp is reckoned to be able to crush from five tons to six tons of material in a day, and, on the average, this amount should contain from $2\frac{1}{2}$ oz. to 3 oz. of gold; so that the amount of gold which might be extracted were labourers at hand can easily be calculated. Every day's delay in commencing work at the mines adds to the cost of the war, and prevents money being earned which would be circulated amongst the workpeople at home. It is most unfortunate that, apparently, Lord Kitchener does not realise this. His capacity for ending the war has yet to be proved; but things look hopeful, and it is devoutly to be wished that success may shortly crown his efforts. Whatever his military successes may be, it cannot be said that

he has added to his reputation as a Civil Administrator as Acting-High Commissioner in Lord Milner's absence. Whether this is entirely his own fault, or whether it is his misfortune to suffer from the maladroitness and zeal of his subordinates, it is difficult to say. His reputed sayings about the mines and the mine guards, his alleged refusal to issue permits for those who could work at the mines, the invidious distinction made between civilians and the military, and, more recently, what is considered his breach of faith with the members of the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles, have rendered him extremely unpopular, whether he deserves it or not.

The case of the Mounted Rifles certainly sounds bad. They were enlisted at Capetown many months ago, when there were urgent requests from Pretoria, and it is alleged from Lord Kitchener himself, to have them enlisted and sent up without delay. A civilian of wealth, and well known both in London and South Africa, but who does not care for having his name published, energetically set about the work, and spared neither time nor money in getting together as fine a body of recruits as could possibly be seen. He got the pick of the men in Capetown and its neighbourhood. The bait he held out was a tempting one: All who enlisted were to get the usual five shillings a day and be provided for; but in addition they were given a pledge that they should be disbanded in Johannesburg. By enlisting they got here free of expense, and they felt certain that on disbandment they would find work. They have served their time, and now want their discharge; but they have been told that being discharged is not the same thing as being disbanded, and that if they claim their discharge they will have to return to Cape Colony. In the opinion of the

Volunteers, the military authorities have been guilty of a distinct breach of faith, and the officer in command in this town did not improve their case by giving his reasons. Upon the civilian who enlisted the men complaining of the breach of faith, the military commandant informed him that he could not be responsible for some 500 or 600 men being turned upon the town. This excuse is considered a case of adding insult to injury. The members of the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles were all of a good class, and most respectable citizens, and they have rendered good service to the King by the work they have done as Volunteers. The treatment of them by the military has created a feeling of disgust and irritation which must do considerable harm to the Volunteer cause. Rightly or wrongly, Lord Kitchener is held responsible for this matter and other matters affecting the Volunteers, and it doubtless in a great measure accounts for his extreme unpopularity amongst civilians, and especially Volunteers. The fact itself is deplorable, and it may have a very pernicious effect upon the future of the country.

One of the chief objects of Mr. Chamberlain's policy has been to unite the colonies more firmly to the United Kingdom by ties of friendship and mutual regard, and in South Africa Lord Milner has laboured unceasingly to carry it out. The action imputed to Lord Kitchener and his subordinates checks and thwarts this admirable policy in every possible way. Neither the War Office nor the military leaders first appointed did much to conciliate colonial opinion or to encourage the Volunteers. The military seemed to think that the war was their show, and that they alone were to run it; and they would brook no interference from Colonials or Volunteers, though many of

these latter had gained much experience in South African warfare. Humiliating as were some of the consequences of this contemptuous indifference to colonial advice, the experience thus gained seems to have had little effect. It is well known that had it not been for the assistance given by the Navy, with its supply of guns, and the Colonial Volunteers, Ladysmith would have fallen and Natal would have been overrun by the Boers, and probably lost for a time to Great Britain. Kimberley must have fallen had it not been for the Colonial Volunteers, and Mafeking, probably, too. At Kimberley the gallant Colonel Kekewich had only 550 Imperial troops, and had it not been for the 4,000 Volunteers who placed their services under his command the town could not have been defended. Nobody has spoken in higher terms of their service than Colonel Kekewich, who had the best means for appraising their value. The great services rendered by the Imperial Light Horse, Kitchener's Horse, Roberts's Horse, and other Volunteer troops, under General Sir Edward Brabant, have been recognised by Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller. If these two latter Generals did not at first pay sufficient regard to Colonial Volunteers, they did eventually, and they could not have acknowledged their services in higher terms than they did. The annoyance to the Volunteers here is to think that after this experience they are still "snubbed." The Mine Guard alone numbers 1,500 men, and, I believe, altogether this town and its district supplies nearly 5,000 Volunteer soldiers. If properly treated, these men would form a nucleus of a military force which would be able to uphold British authority in the newly-annexed colonies without any aid from the Imperial troops; and this is an end devoutly to be wished for, both by the Mother

Country and the colony. It is an object which any statesman would encourage, and any discouragement of it should be severely deprecated. The Rand Rifles are a fine body of men, and it is most fortunate that the Imperial officers who command them understand how to act with them, and are consequently extremely popular. In time there ought to be a large Volunteer Army in South Africa, and for some years it will be essential that they should have a considerable leaven of Imperial officers. In the selection of these not merely a knowledge of drill and military tactics should be recognised, but also tact and a feeling of good fellowship. General Brabant is the ideal of a good Colonial officer. On service he is strict in exacting proper discipline ; off service he mixes with his men without recognising any distinction of rank. Socially, when off duty, there is no distinction between officers and privates, as they all belong to the same class.

CHAPTER VI.

THE HARM DONE BY WELL-INTENTIONED BUT ILL-
INFORMED CONCILIATORS IN ENGLAND.

It is evident that plenty of time will be afforded for discussing the amount of taxation which the newly-annexed colonies should contribute towards the expenses of the war. This is as it should be, and no taxation should be imposed or sanctioned by the Imperial Government till the colonists themselves can be consulted and be in a position to express their opinions on the subject. The power of the purse—that is, the power of disposing of the money made by your own exertions—is the corner-stone of constitutional government, not only in Great Britain and Ireland, but in such dominions beyond the seas as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and it would be a fatal error if an exception were made in regard to South Africa.

Most of the evils which in the past have affected the South African Colonies have arisen from the fact of the colonists themselves not having been consulted, and the consequent ignorance of the Mother Country of their real wants, feelings, and requirements. Even in the present war, had they been consulted by the military authorities, as they ought to have been, affairs would have been very different from what they are. The chances are that had they been consulted and their advice followed the war would have been over long ago, and business would have been re-established, and Great Britain would not have been

compelled to continue spending some million and a half a week in unproductive operations. Ignorance of colonial opinion is not confined to the military, but is shared by the Home Government, and by many leaders of the public, whose intentions are excellent, but who, through ignorance, defeat the very object they are bent on attaining. The despatch of a committee of ladies to inquire into the condition of the Boer concentration camps, and the appeal of the Victoria League for funds to provide "comforts and luxuries" for the Dutch women and children at present detained in the concentration camps, and that the appeal is signed by the Countess of Jersey, the Marchioness of Tweeddale, and the Hon. Mrs. Lyttelton, are two examples which show how completely out of touch are many of the best people at home with their countrymen in South Africa. The action of the Government was regarded at Capetown, Bloemfontein, and Johannesburg as a direct censure upon the conduct of Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener, and the Boers not only shared the view, but proclaimed it loudly. Amongst the many foreigners in Johannesburg—German, French, Italian, and others—who enjoyed advantages denied to British subjects, the matter caused extreme merriment. To them the British character appeared more inexplicable than ever, and they expressed astonishment that those whom they consider proud men, like Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, should put up with such a slight. Though not loving us, and in many ways very prejudiced against us, they acknowledge that the military authorities have treated the Boer refugees and prisoners with the greatest consideration and kindness, and they avow that the defeated Boers have been treated with greater humanity and mercy than they would have been at the hands of any other European

Power. The colonials, knowing the facts, are simply disgusted at the querulous and unfounded complaints made by the Boer partisans in England, and still more disgusted at the weakness of Lord Salisbury's Government in paying any attention to them.

Although the object of the Victoria League is to "strengthen the ties between England and her colonies and dependencies," yet its action, guided by the best intentions, but in absolute ignorance of facts, was calculated to weaken, if not entirely destroy, these ties. The Aldermen and the members of the Common Council of the City of London have a better acquaintance with the South African situation than the influential ladies whose names were appended to the Victoria League's appeal. They recognise that there are loyalists and disloyalists, and their sympathies, naturally, are with the former. Ever since 1881—the year famous for the Majuba incident—there have been two distinct camps in South Africa, one loyal to the British Crown and the other disloyal. The loyal camp comprises amongst its members nearly all the British, with a considerable number of Dutch; while the disloyalists contain amongst their numbers a majority of the Dutch, nearly all the Boers, and a few renegade Britons. The aim of the loyalists was to preserve British ascendancy—that of the disloyalists was to supplant it, with a view to absolute independence. The present war is the result of these conflicting aims, and in it the colonials of South Africa, as well as those of the King's other oversea dominions, have spared neither blood nor money in support of the Mother Country. Thousands have fought and hundreds have fallen in the common cause. In addition to these, there are between 60,000 and 70,000 individuals—women and children, and men too old or too feeble for

active service—who are refugees in Cape Colony or Natal. Their deprivations and sufferings are much greater than is to be found in any concentration camp of the Boers. They were inhabitants of Pretoria, or Johannesburg, or of some parts of the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. They do not want to live on charity, and many of them are so proud that they will suffer almost any hardship rather than apply for relief. They are people of whom no country need feel ashamed. Their one object is to return to their homes when they can resume work, and gain an honest livelihood. Why are they prevented from carrying out this most laudable object? Because the military authorities, under whose control the railways are, say that under present conditions sufficient food cannot be brought up for them as well as for the 63,000 Boer refugees whom they say they are bound to support in accordance with a promise unfortunately given by Lord Roberts. Hence the present picture—63,000 loyalists kept in enforced idleness, many of them on the verge of starvation, and 63,000 disloyal Boers enjoying a freedom from work they delight in, and well fed and cared for by the British Government at an expense, it is said, of £300,000 a month.

This was the state of affairs when the news came that the British Government was so anxious about the welfare of the disloyalists that, not content with the supervision of Lords Kitchener and Milner, they were sending out some estimable ladies to see that these noble lords did their duty, and that British ladies of high social position were exerting themselves to increase the "comforts and luxuries" of the disloyalists without having a word of sympathy or any help for the loyalists. In England, Lady Jersey is well known for the active part she has taken in the work of the Primrose

League, and in the powerful aid she has given both by her writings and speeches to the excellent work that league has undertaken ; but the colonials do not know this, and very naturally ask whether she and the ladies acting with her are pro-Boers. These two announcements, added to what is considered by a majority of the colonials as the inefficiency and incompetence of many of the military commanders, and occasionally the arrogance of some, produced very bitter feelings and strained the spirit of loyalty to the utmost. It is to be feared that the tactics of some of those in power will cause in the future more trouble with the loyalists than there has been with the disloyalists. As for the disloyal Boers, this gushing kindness of the good people at home is entirely thrown away. It is misinterpreted, and simply considered a sign of weakness. There is no gratitude, though it is not difficult to simulate it to ladies like Miss Hobhouse ; but the real feeling is one of contempt for what the majority, at least, consider either British imbecility or British hypocrisy. None of the colonists wish to be unkind to the Boers ; but they know them well from experience, and what they say is that the time for kindness must be after the war. Till peace is made and assured on a firm basis, kindness is interpreted as a weakness, or as a bait thrown out to induce the Boers to surrender. It has prolonged the war, and it is doing so now. Returning good for evil is not esteemed as it should be by those who profess to act upon the principles set forth in the Sermon on the Mount. Of the evil manner in which the British refugees were treated when they were expelled from Pretoria and Johannesburg there can be no doubt. No Boer ladies came forward to increase the "comforts and luxuries" of the poor British women who, with infants in

their arms, were huddled into coal trucks, and who were treated with brutal indignities by many of the Boer men. That treatment has unfortunately left an indelible mark in the memory of many a poor British refugee, and the sting of the mark is not lessened when they see such care for the disloyalists who were guilty of such cruel conduct, and such neglect of the loyalists, whose only fault seems to have been steadfastness in supporting their Mother Country. The good food, too, supplied to the Boers, not only in the concentration camps, but also in the locations assigned to the prisoners, and the attention paid to their comforts, is in striking contrast to what was supplied to British prisoners, military and civilian, at Pretoria and other places. The spirit of the proverb that charity begins at home seems to be no longer heeded in England, and to bless their enemies and neglect their own kith and kin and loyal supporters apparently is now the fashion in high quarters.

CHAPTER VII.

COLONIAL VIEWS OF THE JAMESON RAID—LOYALISTS AND
THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT.

A MATTER which excites animosity amongst those loyal to Great Britain is the manner in which the Raid is spoken of and the way in which those who were connected with it are treated. Even so well-informed a man as Mr. Asquith spoke of "the iniquity of the Raid." His conduct with the Liberal Imperialists in regard to the war attracted much attention amongst Colonials, and has gone a long way to redeem the Liberal party from that distrust with which they have been so long regarded on questions of Imperial policy. Whether he used the phrase as a kind of rhetoric flourish to show his judicial impartiality in a speech the main object of which was to justify the warlike policy of Lord Milner and the Government, or whether he seriously meant what he is reported to have said, is doubtful. It is to be hoped that the first hypothesis is the correct one.

By many the question of the Raid might have been considered as dead and buried ; but as it is constantly cropping up, and having a visible effect upon certain Government appointments, it is well that something should be said upon the subject. With regard to its object, it was precisely the same as that for which the present war was commenced and is being continued—viz., to upset the corrupt tyranny of ex-President Kruger and his oligarchy of Hollanders. It is

now generally admitted, except by a small band of extreme pro-Boers, that it was in no way the cause of the war. Some say that it has accelerated the war, and if it has a debt of national gratitude is due to those who took part in it; for it is certain that the longer the commencement of hostilities was postponed the worse it would have been for Great Britain. As to the manner in which it was attempted to be carried out, it must be admitted by all impartial critics that there was much bungling, blundering, and misunderstanding, and the result was absolute failure. Failure, however, in the successful carrying out of a project does not prove that the project itself was wrong. In former times such members of the Liberal and Radical parties as Lord Palmerston, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Stansfeld, and others sympathised warmly with the attempts which the Italians and Hungarians made to throw over the Austrian tyranny under which they groaned, and though both Garibaldi and Kossuth failed in their first attempts for freedom, this did not quench their sympathy or prevent them from giving their moral support to the future efforts of the Italian and Hungarian patriots. The robust faith of the old Liberalism seems to be emasculated in the modern Radical school, and in a feeble and weak-kneed manner they pretend there is a difference between former struggles against oppression and the more recent one in the Transvaal, on the ground that the latter strugglers were capitalists. They are equally wrong in their facts and in their reasoning.

In the great Free Trade campaign the champions of the capitalist manufacturers and merchants of Lancashire and Yorkshire were Messrs. Cobden and Bright, and their vic-

tory increased enormously the wealth of the capitalists ; but it even increased more, by cheapening the price of food and clothing, the prosperity and well-being of the working classes. The merest tyro in political economy knows that in the increase of capital and in the growth of national wealth it is the artizans and labourers who benefit most, and especially in countries where they have the political franchise and a potent voice in their own government. Had the Raid succeeded, and had, as was intended, a plébiscite been taken, and had Joubert or some other enlightened Boer been elected President, as was anticipated, to succeed Kruger, there can be no doubt that the despotic, narrow-minded, and most corrupt Government of Kruger and his Hollander gang would have been swept away and another put in its place, under whose auspices the right of voting would have been given to the people, restrictions upon trade and prohibitive protective duties abolished, and freedom and liberty restored to the population at large. Joubert, it must be remembered, had once been elected President by a majority of burgher votes, and was only prevented from occupying the post by the most unscrupulous tampering with the ballot boxes by Kruger and his satellites. As to facts, the Transvaal capitalists, as a class, do not deserve the credit of being the authors of the Raid. They were against it. With a timidity not unusual amongst men of wealth, they held back. They knew and recognised the evils which existed, but they preferred to endure the dangers they knew of rather than to fly to others they knew not of. Had the majority had their own way there would have been no Raid. The Raid was essentially a popular movement. Those who promoted it, and took part in it, were hard-headed men of business—engineers, lawyers, bank and mine managers, foremen, shop-

keepers, artisans, and miners. It was only when the tide of popular feeling was so strong that it seemed as if it would carry everything before it that some of the capitalists joined the movement, for fear, perhaps, of being engulfed in the whirlpool which it was creating. If the object of the Raid was, as it certainly was, the same as that for the attainment of which the present war was commenced, it is difficult to see how Unionists and Liberal Imperialists can condemn it. As to the bungling, blundering, and misunderstandings which occasioned its failure, surely those who were supposed to be guilty of these misfeasances have suffered more than enough in heavy fines and imprisonment in Pretoria and in London, and surely, also, no conscientious Briton can deny that there have been equal bunglings, blunderings, and misunderstandings in the conduct of the present campaign, and that if Justice were even-handed, as is supposed, and these misfeasances were to be considered criminal, there would now be under the paternal care of Colonel Milman, at Holloway, some high War Office officials, perhaps even a Cabinet Minister, and in all probability a General or two. It is true that these latter have been guilty of no technical offence against international law—even of any infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act; but their blunders have occasioned infinitely greater loss upon the country.

The future welfare of South Africa will depend not only on the kind of government which is established, but also on the individuals who shall be appointed to carry it on. Half, at least, of the mistakes which have been made in the past have been caused by bad appointments to important posts—the square peg in the round hole, and vice versâ. In South Africa itself there are only three classes from which appointments can be made—viz., from those who were in favour

of the Raid, and those who were against it, and those who are styled "mugwumps," or men who have a skill for sitting on the fence almost equal to that attributed to the present nominal and amiable leader of the Radical party at Westminster. Prudence would dictate that none of these three classes should be tabooed and considered disqualified for future appointments, and least of all the loyalists, who were mostly on the side of the Raid. Amongst the old disloyalists and the "mugwumps" there are some men of ability, and there is no reason why the State should be deprived of their services if their loyalty can be depended upon for the future. Amongst the loyalists there are more men of ability, of superior education, of high character, and of greater personal influence than amongst the other two classes together. To pass these over because of their connection with the Raid would be a fatal error, and would lead to most disastrous results.

Unfortunately, some recent appointments, and some recent refusals to confirm appointments, give colour to the suggestion that this fatal error may be made. Up to the present time the Colonials have had, and they have still, the greatest confidence in Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office and in Lord Milner as High Commissioner; but it cannot be denied that they are beginning to doubt the courage and the strength of the Government generally. As far as the numbers of its supporters go, it is known to be the strongest Administration of modern times. There is practically no organised Opposition; so it would be thought that the present Ministry were all-powerful; yet in action they appear weak and pusillanimous. They never seem to support the loyal portion of the Colonists, and they quail and quiver before the questions and speeches

of the few in the House of Commons who are the supporters of the disloyalists. The nerves of some of the Ministers appear to be so highly strung that the mere mention of some subjects, like the Raid, seems to put them all in a flutter. Attention to the enemy and neglect of friends is not a safe or a sound policy: the foes are not conciliated and the friends are estranged. To forget the past services of the loyalists in South Africa, and to pass them over in future appointments, will be a most serious aggravation of the difficulties necessarily attendant upon framing a new scheme of government.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT LORD MILNER AS
ADMINISTRATOR.

It is fortunate for the future prospects of South Africa that the present High Commissioner, Lord Milner, is not only a statesman of the highest order who has gauged rightly the situation in the country, with all its political bearings, but also a financier with a large amount of experience. His training in the Treasury and the Inland Revenue Office at home has been supplemented by the work he did in Egypt with Lord Cromer—himself one of the first financiers of the day. Sound finance is the true basis of a country's prosperity, and many useful lessons may be gathered from the experience in Egypt since 1883.

In that year, it will be remembered, Lord Cromer (then known as Sir Evelyn Baring) was appointed Consul-General, and the country over which he was called upon to rule was in the throes of bankruptcy. Its debt amounted to over £100,000,000, and annual deficits went to increase it. Sir Evelyn Baring started by increasing the debt by £9,000,000, under the united guarantee of the Great Powers; and the special point to be noted in this new loan was that it was not all raised for the purpose of paying off existing liabilities, but that a large portion of it was devoted to the construction of works, which were anticipated, and have since proved, to be reproductive. The completion of the barrage, commenced years before under French

supervision, and for a time abandoned as a hopeless task, was undertaken on money borrowed for the purpose, and the money so sunk has proved a splendid investment. At the present time in Egypt, insolvent in 1883, ranks as one of the most solvent countries in the world, with an annual surplus which many of the Great Powers may look upon with envy ; and her solvency and prosperous condition are due to the able and prudent administration of Lord Cromer, and the corner-stone of his administration has been sound finance, with judicious investment of public money in reproductive works. The success attending the completion of the barrage has led to the creation of the Phylæ reservoirs, under the masterly care of Sir John Aird, and there can be no doubt that this system of storage of the Nile water and applying it to the land by a proper system of irrigation has added, and will add, thousands of square miles of cultivable land to Egypt.

Few understand better the causes of Egyptian progress and prosperity than Lord Milner, and South Africa will have the advantage of the experience he gained while working there with Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer had difficulties to contend with which will not obstruct Lord Milner ; but there are also in South Africa difficulties to be overcome which did not exist in Egypt. In what may be termed the great birth of Imperialism as affecting the Colonial Empire, by means of which the Mother Country has learnt to value her colonies, and they, in return, have learnt to appreciate highly their connection with her, Lords Cromer and Milner will stand out as distinctive Governors very different from the type of Governors who have presided over colonies and dependencies in the past. *Laissez-faire* and *laissez-aller* were the principles upon which most Governors in former

times were compelled to act. The great idea of the Cobden School, whose influence was paramount from 1850 to 1874, was to let the colonies alone to take care of themselves, and the Governor who was least heard of was the model who was most admired. A retiring modesty and quiet self-effacement were the characteristics most appreciated. Negative rather than affirmative qualifications were prized. In such colonies as Australia and New Zealand, where the colonists were good specimens of the Anglo-Saxon race, with sturdy wills of their own and a strong feeling of independence and self-reliance, and not many jarring elements to contend with, except those of Nature herself, which could be overcome by daring enterprise and steady industry, it is probable that this class of Governor was the best; and the result is sufficient justification of the policy. In Egypt and South Africa matters were very different. Constructive and diplomatic as well as administrative talents are requisite. The foreign element, with its many complications, was, and is, present. The fellaheen by themselves might have been as easily dealt with as were the aborigines of Australia or the Maori tribes of New Zealand; and the Kaffirs and Bantu tribes of South Africa, though made of sterner stuff and being endowed with greater courage and more warlike qualities than the Egyptians or the Australian aborigines, though not than the Maoris, have already been so brought under civilised control that at present they can hardly be considered a dangerous factor for the ruling power to deal with.

In Egypt France was the fountain of all the difficulties, and in South Africa it is the Dutch. Lord Cromer's hands were tied by the capitulations, and France utilised them to harass and thwart him, and it required great tact and much delicate diplomacy to gain the assistance of the other Powers

to checkmate the designs of the French Republic. The action of Turkey—working at one time with and at another against the Khedivial family—did not tend to diminish difficulties. His greatest difficulty at first, however, was the weakness and vacillation of the Government who had appointed him. The foreign and colonial policy of the Gladstone Cabinet, with Lord Granville at the Foreign Office and Lord Derby at the Colonial, was absolute impotence, with an incapacity for consistency and consecutiveness which excited the derision and contempt of the world. Had that Cabinet been returned to power in 1886, it is almost a certainty that Egypt and the Soudan provinces would have been wrested from the influence and control of Great Britain. Lord Cromer himself would be the first to acknowledge that had it not been for the firm and loyal support he has always received from Lord Salisbury during his long period of office, and from Lord Rosebery during the short time he was Foreign Minister, he could not have accomplished the great work he has done in North Africa. With regard to Lord Milner, many of the Dutch would give him as much trouble as the French did to Lord Cromer, if they could. But their wings are clipped. The present war has smashed the power of the Boers, and it is doubtful whether there will be much sympathy between these latter and the Dutch in the Cape Colony. Sensible Boers must feel that they have been “sold” by their Cape brothers. Had it not been for the incitement of the Cape Afrikaners, it is more than doubtful whether the Boers would ever have had recourse to fighting. They received much encouragement in words from the Cape members of the Bond; but when the gloves were taken off and real fighting commenced these latter were conspicuous by their absence. The general feeling

is that the action of the Cape pro-Boers has been mean and shabby, not to say cowardly, in the extreme.

It does not follow from this that the Cape Dutch will not give more trouble in the future. Many think there will be much more trouble with them in Cape Colony than there will be with the Boers in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. They are clever at underground working, and justify the name of "mole" which Mr. Merriman applied to one of their leaders. It is probable that Lord Milner will find the Boers more amenable, and not such intriguers as many he had to deal with when he was Governor of the Cape. However kindness, generosity, and magnanimity may be now thrown away upon many of the Boers, it is certain that when peace is assured upon a solid foundation his policy towards the Boers will be as conciliatory as circumstances will permit, and that he will at the same time take care that those British subjects who have remained loyal throughout the whole of the trying struggle shall be properly supported and rewarded. One advantage he will have over Lord Cromer at the start : from the first he is sure to be supported at home. Weakness and vacillation are not, fortunately, characteristic of Mr. Chamberlain, and his colonial policy has been marked by consistency and consecutiveness, and Lord Milner may rely upon his ungrudging support as much as Lord Cromer has done upon that of Lord Salisbury. He will not find himself, either, as Lord Cromer did, with a council of elected representatives who did not know the meaning of self-government. That he will make the colonies under his charge self-governing as soon as possible is certain ; but, then, he will have among the colonists men of ability and standing, who have been accustomed to self-government, and the freedom and

responsibility which it implies, and who understand it, and will be able to take its burthen upon their shoulders.

In carrying on the administration, and in propounding a proper and workable system of government, his difficulties will not be great. His chief difficulty will be the land—how to fertilise it and how to attract to it population. The mineral wealth of South Africa in gold, diamonds, copper, and coal is enormous ; but the mines can well be left to take care of themselves. The towns which will spring up in the neighbourhood of the mines, and which will form valuable markets for dairy and other agricultural produce, will not want any artificial encouragement, but will manage their own affairs without any extraneous assistance. Agricultural land near them will be very valuable, and will not require governmental attention. But the vast areas of land beyond—these form the problem which will cry for solution. Can South Africa be made a prosperous agricultural country as well as a wealthy mineral one ? If Lord Milner can solve this question satisfactorily, he will be considered not merely a great statesman, but also one of the greatest benefactors to mankind of the age.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EXTENT AND POSSIBILITIES OF BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.

FEW people realise the extent of the King's dominions beyond the seas in Africa. Their area in square miles is far larger than his dominions in any other of the continents. Without Egypt and the Soudan, the area is 3,244,000 square miles, and with these countries, which are practically, though not nominally, under the protectorate of Great Britain, it amounts to 4,544,000. This is, roughly speaking, nearly 1,000,000 more square miles than the British territory in Canada, 1,500,000 more than that in Australia, and nearly 3,000,000 more than that in India. It is 1,000,000 square miles more, too, than the whole of the United States territory. Out of this enormous expanse of country in Africa 1,640,000 square miles are now under Lord Milner as High Commissioner, and these, it is hoped, will before very long be the United States of South Africa, under one Governor, with self-government in each of the separate colonies forming parts of it. Some members of the United States of America have been boasting that their vast continent will supply its inhabitants with all the necessities and luxuries of life, and that they can live independent of the whole world outside; and that, further, it will be in their power, if not to starve the rest of the world, at least to deprive it of many of its comforts. Whatever foundation there may be for this bombastic boast, if it were true of America, there is no reason why it should not be true of Africa, though it is not likely that Lord Milner

would waste time in making any quixotic attempt to carry it out. He has been nurtured in the school of Free Traders, and he will probably apply Free Trade principles to Africa as much as circumstances will permit.

As I said in a former letter, the mines and the towns can take care of themselves. They are closely connected, and the great companies which work them have a vast amount of capital to back them, and the financiers, managers, and engineers connected with them are a highly-educated body of men, whose business is best managed where there is least Government interference. This, however, is not the case with the country or with the agriculture which should be its staple industry. It cannot be said that up to the present time agriculture has been a success in South Africa; but, then, it has had no chance of succeeding. The Dutch and the Boers are not good farmers. Though full of energy in Holland, and famous for their hardy work and for the attention they have given to gardening and horticulture, in Africa they have become demoralised by their contact with the coloured races. They are intensely lazy, and their one desire seems to have been to have enormous farms of extensive acreage, where cattle could roam at large and feed while they sit idle and drink bad coffee and smoke bad tobacco, and what little work there was to do could be done by Kaffirs, who were kept well in order by the use of the sjambok.

One of the most singular phenomena of the present day is the support given by the extreme section of the Radical Party in England to the Boers. No two classes, in their views and in their actions, can be more opposed than Boers and British Radicals. Boers are intensely conservative, and hate change of any description; Radicals love change

merely for change's sake, and look upon Conservatism as one of the deadly sins. The Boers are landowners, and have a contempt for merchants and business men and dwellers in towns; Radicals hate landowners, and are always boasting of the superior civilisation of citizens who live and work in the towns. The Boers are intensely religious, their religion being of the narrowest description possible, and one which flatters their vanity by holding them out as the chosen people of the Lord. Such leaders of the Radical and Little England Party as Mr. Morley, Mr. Labouchere, and Mr. Courtney have not been famous for the respect they have paid to religion, and they are generally credited with considering religious opinions and practices like those of the Boers as grovelling superstitions. The Boers have supreme faith in the use of the stick and the sjambok, and apply them most freely, and often most cruelly, to blacks and whites alike, whereas the Radicals are vehemently opposed to corporal punishment, and even shudder at the idea of a birch-rod being applied to the cuticle of a small boy under fourteen years of age. The Radicals, with a consistency unusual amongst them, have always opposed slavery; the Boers believe in slaves, and would restore them to-morrow if they could. The Boers are anti-progressive in everything; with British Radicals progress is the first article of their creed. It is this hatred of progress on the part of the Boers, and the superstitious belief that the plagues which afflict their country are the acts of God, and therefore not to be interfered with, which have retarded agriculture in South Africa. Many think it flying in the face of Providence to devise means for destroying locusts and mosquitoes, or to take precautions against fevers and other diseases arising from insanitary

conditions. Had the Boers remained masters of the Transvaal, agriculture would never have been properly developed ; and the wealth of the mines would have lain dormant had it not been for the enterprise of other Europeans, chiefly British.

South Africa's chief want for the purpose of agriculture is a proper system of irrigation, such as exists in Egypt. The country has none of the vast navigable rivers which have been such an important factor in promoting American prosperity, and it has no Nile, with its millions upon millions of gallons of water, which, when applied to land, converts the arid desert into a smiling garden. But it has water which can have as magical effects as that of the Nile. The rainfall in South Africa is ample. It is confined to certain parts of the year in different districts, and comes in such quantities that the greater part of it is wasted. The question to be solved is, Can it be so stored and applied to the land as to make the capital spent in it a paying investment ? Fortunately, experience will soon be at hand to afford the necessary instruction. Mr. Cecil Rhodes is at the present moment making the experiment. The late General Gordon was a great friend and admirer of Mr. Rhodes, though many of their characteristics were essentially different. The General, as is well known, was perfectly indifferent to money, and had refused large sums which had been offered him in China and elsewhere ; and it cannot be said that Mr. Rhodes shares this weakness. In conversation with the General in 1882, on the subject of money and its advantages and drawbacks, he told him that it was of no use to have big ideas unless those who had them had pounds, shillings, and pence to carry them out. Without subscribing to the exact accuracy of this opinion, for a

pauper with big ideas may influence a millionaire, with none of his own, 'to adopt them and carry them out, it is certain that Mr. Rhodes has done what is very rare—practised what he preached ; and the result promises to be full of advantage to South Africa. Large as his income is said to be, it is alleged he spends the greater part in promoting and helping others to carry out his ideas for the development of Rhodesia and other parts of Africa. When in Egypt he witnessed the wonderful effects of water storage there, and this seems to have determined him to try the same experiment in Rhodesia. He possesses a very large farm near the Matopo Hills, some 19 miles from Bulawayo, and here, at an expense of about £30,000 he has had made a large reservoir. Its length is 436 ft. and its width at the base 319 ft. A large dam has been erected rising 78 ft. above the ground, while the deepest point below the level of the surface is 70 ft. The reservoir is capable of storing 1,000,000,000 gallons of water. Its absolute success for the purposes of irrigation cannot be assured till after the next rainfall, but up to the present time the experiment has been successful, and it promises to be completely so now that the works are finished, and all that is required is the filling of the reservoir with water. With the water in it, during the last six months, some 50 acres of land adjoining it has been irrigated, and the dried-up grass of which it consisted before irrigation is now converted into a crop of lucerne of brilliant emerald green, most refreshing for the eye to look upon, and also very valuable for sale in the market.

It is no exaggeration to say that the application of water at the proper time to such land as is to be found in millions of acres in Rhodesia increases its value a hundredfold. Land which is comparatively valueless will grow produce which

will give an annual profit of some '£20 an acre. After the next rainfall it is calculated that from this new reservoir more than 2,000 acres of land can be irrigated, and that these 2,000 acres, instead of growing merely long grass, which is good enough for cattle-ranching, will grow all kinds of farm and market-garden produce. If that is so—and a very short time is now required to prove the success or the contrary of the experiment—a most valuable return will be made upon the capital expended, and a revolution in agriculture in Rhodesia will be the result. What is true of Rhodesia will prove true of the Transvaal. In some respects the land in the former is better suited for farming than that in the latter. Throughout Rhodesia there is an abundance of long grass which is very nourishing for 'cattle, and there is plenty of wood and no want of water for ordinary purposes, and it is anticipated there will be more for agricultural purposes when the system of water storage becomes general.

On the other hand, for years to come the Transvaal must have the advantage of having better markets for the sale of agricultural produce. Such towns as Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the numberless small towns which spring up wherever mining operations are successful, make admirable centres to which to bring agricultural produce. The demand for vegetables, fruit, and fodder is very large, and the supply at present is very insufficient. Good farming within reach of any of these centres must pay. Whatever Government may be formed at first for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, one of its first considerations should be how to encourage agriculture; and for this purpose nothing is more essential than a proper scheme of irrigation. Money may be required, as it was in Egypt, and probably a loan would be

necessary; but there is ample security for it in the country itself, and it would be most certainly reproductive. All that the Mother Country should do is what the Great Powers collectively did in Egypt—viz., guarantee the loan, and so save the colonies 1 per cent. at least in interest. It is quite possible that were schemes of irrigation promoted and carried out by the Government in certain districts, the example set would be followed by some of the companies which own large tracts of land in other parts of the country. Irrigation and increased means of transit are two crying wants of the newly-annexed colonies, as well as of Rhodesia, and if the Government will take the initiative in helping to provide them a lasting benefit will be bestowed upon South Africa, which will react to the advantage of Great Britain also.

In the Transvaal, and also in the Orange River Colony, and probably also in Rhodesia, a supply of water may be obtained in some places by boring. In helping farmers to do this the Natal Government has set a good example. What is called a diamond-drill instrument is too expensive a machine for a farmer himself to buy, so the Government have a stock in hand which they let out at so much a day, just as in England steam ploughs and threshing machines are let out. By the use of these a sufficient quantity of water may be discovered for agricultural purposes, and it would be well if the new Government were to act as the Natal Government already has done.

The Natal Government has set a very good example in giving attention to means for getting rid of locusts and other plagues which interfere with agriculture, and under Lord Milner's judicious guidance the Transvaal Government, when formed, will doubtless act in a similar manner.

CHAPTER X.

HOW TO INCREASE AND STRENGTHEN THE BRITISH
ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY.

RACIAL feeling, with the antipathies and hatreds it begets, is one of the most difficult questions with which statesmen have to deal. In South Africa the feeling has been aggravated by two causes—first, the British policy with regard to the coloured population, and, secondly, the difference between the tastes, avocations, and interests of the British and the Dutch. The latter are nearly all farmers, dwelling in the country; the former are nearly all business men, dwelling in towns. The interests of those who reside in towns and those who reside in the country have often been opposed, or, at least, the respective residents have thought so. The countryman is apt to look upon the townsman as soft, effeminate, and no sportsman; while the latter considers the former as uncivilised, uncouth, and wanting in education and manners. In England, during the Free Trade contest, the feeling between the agriculturists and the townspeople was very bitter, and at the present time it is so in Germany. The Dutch, and especially the Boers, are farmers by taste and inclination, though it must be admitted that in South Africa they are very bad and unprogressive ones. The British, as a rule, flock to the towns. This has been the case in Cape Colony, and in the Transvaal the country has been almost entirely neglected by the British

for the sake of crowding into Johannesburg. If a portion of the Boers could be induced to take to work in towns and another portion of the British could be induced to adopt farming as an occupation great good would result. With regard to the Boers, they must, of course, be left to do as they like ; but it is possible that the spread of education amongst them may influence some of them to give up their present lazy life in the country districts and take to making money by more active exertions in the towns. As for the British, if they can be induced to settle on farms, they who do so will be enabled to earn a fair living and lead a life which is considered enjoyable by the farmer and country gentleman at home. The climate is superb ; there is a certain amount of sport, which could be increased by care and attention, and, according to competent authorities, farming, if properly conducted, would pay. If a sufficient number settled on the land, and mixed with their neighbours, the chances are that they would soon become good friends, notwithstanding the difference of race.

On this subject, as on that of irrigation, experience is at hand to act as a guide. British Governments have always been slow to give what they call artificial encouragement to immigration ; but in South Africa the experiment has been tried twice, and on both occasions it has succeeded. The want of British settlers in Cape Colony was felt in the year 1819, and the British Parliament voted £50,000 to defray the expenses of settlers going out, and the result was that between March, 1820, and May, 1821, nearly 5,000 individuals of British birth settled in South Africa. Though these settlers had many difficulties to contend with, they eventually prospered, and their descendants are amongst the most loyal of Great Britain's colonists. In 1859 some

2,000 peasants from North Germany were imported under a contract between Sir George Grey, who was then Governor of Cape Colony, and a Hamburg merchant, and land was allotted to them, and they made excellent settlers, prospered on the land, and are now amongst the most loyal of His Majesty's subjects. Their loyalty, notwithstanding their former nationality, has been conspicuous during the present war, and when called upon to give assistance, by Colonel Shermbrucker, they readily responded to the call. A more recent experiment has been tried by Mr. Rhodes. Some years ago he purchased 30 farms in the Paarl district of Cape Colony. The district was peopled with Dutch farmers, and it was a strong centre of Afrikaner Bondism. It has always returned a Bondite to the Legislative Assembly. On all these farms he planted British farmers, and he afforded them help to help themselves, and the result so far has been extremely satisfactory. The farms are now the best, not merely in Cape Colony,¹ but in South Africa. They are practically model farms, and they have done much to improve farming generally in the immediate neighbourhood. The British farmers have mixed freely with those of Dutch origin, and many have become excellent friends, and some have intermarried with the Dutch women. Politically, the effect has been most singular. At the last election the majority for the Bond candidate was very largely reduced, and it is confidently anticipated that upon¹ the new register at the next election a Progressive will be returned. The principle that the best way to diminish, and perhaps even to eradicate, the evil of racial difference is to create common interests and to bring the members of both races together as much as possible, is sound, and action upon it so far has been eminently successful. The question which Lord

Milner and the Home Government have to decide is whether it is worth while to try what has hitherto been done on a small scale on a large one.

Mr. Arnold-Forster and the Land Commission over which he presided are in favour of the principle ; but the means they suggest for applying it seem painfully inadequate. They assert, most rightly, that "a well-considered scheme of settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South Africa," and, equally rightly, they add that "the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked the war would be absolutely wasted unless some strenuous efforts be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible." The premises are magnificent, but the conclusion they deduce from them is lame and impotent. "If it costs," they say, "£200,000,000 to restore order in South Africa, it will pay, putting the matter on a business footing, to set aside another million or so to secure immunity from a further large expenditure." Having spent £200,000,000 on destruction, to spend a "million or so" on reconstruction, so as to prevent the necessity of expending another £200,000,000 on destruction, is splendid advice if the course suggested will have the effect promised or foreshadowed. The antidote seems small, considering the nature and strength of the disease ; and the question arises whether this small amount of money so spent would not be thrown away and wasted, and whether, if an attempt is to be made in this direction, it should not be made on a much larger scale. What is worth doing is worth doing well and thoroughly, and the suggestion of this Commission, founded

as it is on right premises, would, if carried out, be but as a drop in the ocean. Mr. Rhodes, whose well-nigh thirty years of life in South Africa would naturally give him more practical knowledge of the country and its wants than could any two months inquiry, however intelligently conducted, has laid before the Government a plan which seems to have in it far greater elements of success. According to him, a farmer in South Africa should start with £4,000 capital. His farm should consist of not less than 4,000 acres, and for the purchase of this a sum of £1,500 would be required. To start with, he would want some fifty head of cattle, costing him, at £12 a head, £600, and he would want a further £1,000 to secure 1,000 sheep, and the remaining £900 would be necessary for the erection of buildings, the purchase of wagons and trek-oxen, and for the expenses of his first year. The erections for residence or farm purposes are not here of the elaborate and substantial description often seen in England. At first, corrugated iron structures suffice, and when the farmer thrives and prospers these give way to more pretentious buildings, which would be comfortably furnished, and always supplied with the piano which the late Lord Exeter thought an unnecessary luxury for the British farmhouse.

If any palpable effect is to be made upon the population of the Transvaal, a much larger sum than "a million or so" will be required in the first instance. In the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony there are some 7,000 farmholdings, and a great many of them are now vacant, and in the market. Were a minimum number of 2,000 British farmers given possession of a similar number of farms, some real impression would be made. It is possible that some of them would have money of their own, and not require to

borrow the whole of the £4,000 required; but Mr. Rhodes's scheme assumes that they have not, and that they would all require the same assistance, and in that case a loan of £8,000,000 would be necessary. The Transvaal itself could well support the loan, and much more, and the expenditure of the money judiciously would be reproductive, and benefit the whole colony. The temptation to the farmer would be to work, so that in a comparatively short time the farm might become his freehold. The Imperial Government would only be asked to guarantee the loan, so that it might be raised at 1 per cent. less interest. The interest so saved should go to a sinking fund, which would enable the farmer to pay off his debt in thirty years at the longest. He should have the option of paying it off at any time, and were he prosperous he might become owner of his land much sooner. His rent, in the shape of interest on loan and provision for sinking fund, would be at first £140 a year, and the security he could offer would be the farm-land with his stock and buildings. Great care would be required in the choice of tenants, and special commissioners with practical experience should be appointed for the purpose. The temptation hitherto has been to leave the country, and to rush to Johannesburg, with the idea of making a fortune quickly. Fortunes have been made here in the past; but there will not be the same opportunities in the future. That the mining interest will develop enormously, that the return from the Rand mines will increase greatly, and that Johannesburg as a town will grow and prosper are certainties, and there will, no doubt, be room for a certain amount of speculation; but it is not likely that any fortunes can be made such as they were in the early days of the discovery of the goldfields. Conditions, however,

should be made to prevent those farmers who start upon borrowed money from leaving their farms till the debt is paid off or a British successor equally good is substituted. One question awaiting solution in South Africa is the formation of a Volunteer Army, to defend themselves against all comers ; and a condition might be made with all those who receive aid from the State that they should serve in some military capacity.

In the Orange River Colony—in that portion of it called the conquered territory—there is a better supply of water than in other parts of South Africa, and the rains fall at seasons suitable for agriculture. The attainment and stocking of these farms would not be so expensive, as farming could be done on a much smaller scale. Farming and agriculture are what specially demand the attention of the new Government in the annexed territories, and schemes such as Mr. Rhodes has suggested, and others, are well worthy their consideration. The towns, as I have already said, can take care of themselves, and the sooner they have self-government the better, and their increase, which is certain, must benefit agriculture in every possible way. There will be a large demand for all kinds of agricultural produce, and those who supply it must make good livings.

A suggestion made by a British farmer who has successfully farmed in Cape Colony for over thirty years is worthy of consideration. He, himself, is an excellent specimen of the country gentleman—some 6 ft. in height, erect in figure, healthy in appearance, and carrying his more than sixty years as if he were fifty, and devoted to sport and country pursuits. He has five stalwart sons, the youngest of whom is nineteen, and all of whom have done good service in the present war. He recognises the fact that in England there

are many well-to-do parents who do not know what to do with their boys when they get to fifteen or sixteen years of age. The boys may not promise well for the professions, and they do not care for business which implies a desk and an office, and farming at home is not good enough. If they were sent out here and boarded at the different farmhouses, they would lead a life they would like, and at about twenty or twenty-one be in a position to commence farming on their own account. Their lives would be passed chiefly in the open air, and a healthier one could hardly be imagined; they would learn farming adapted to the country, and they would be able to indulge in the outdoor sport so dear to the heart of every healthy British boy. He assured me that numbers of the best British and Dutch farmers would be glad to take such boarders at £60 a year. Care, of course, would have to be taken as to the farmhouses at which they were boarded; but the scheme seems possible and promising. It would form a school for a British plantation in the Transvaal, and there can be little doubt that in course of time there would be intermarriages, which would tend to abolish the prejudices of both races. Boys who had been boarded for four or five years in this way would gain an experience which would be invaluable to them when they wanted to start farming on their own account.

An Agricultural Department should form a very important part of any new Government scheme framed for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, and, with adequate funds at their disposal, they could do much for the encouragement of agriculture and the benefit of the country generally. The wonder is that the fine territory in South Africa has been so long neglected. With its vast extent—the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony being 148,000

square miles and Rhodesia 750,000 more—it holds out a future for healthy and remunerative occupation for British subjects, and others, for generations to come, and its possession by Great Britain should relieve us from all fears of the dangers of too large a population at home. All that is wanted is good government, and with Lord Milner as High Commissioner, and representative institutions promised, this may be counted on as a certainty.

CHAPTER XI.

THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF IMMEDIATELY GRANTING
SELF-GOVERNMENT.

WITH the dawn of peace many questions regarding the coloured population education, the dual language, the Volunteer Army, and the capital of the Transvaal will crop up and press for solution, and the one thing to be borne in mind by British Ministers is that no solution of any of these questions can be satisfactorily settled unless the Colonials themselves are consulted and have a voice in their settlement. The Anglo-Saxon race, not only in Great Britain itself, but in America and in the colonies and throughout the world, has only faith in one kind of government—viz., government of themselves by themselves. Strong as this feeling is in all the King's dominions beyond the seas where the British reside, there is no portion of those dominions where the feeling is stronger than in the Transvaal.

The great majority of the inhabitants of Johannesburg were British, and they rightly objected to being domineered over by a few ignorant Boers and intriguing Hollanders; and they were strongly opposed to having to pay nearly all the taxes without having any voice in how they were levied and how they were spent. The spirit which existed then exists now. In certain quarters there appears to be a prejudice against the town and its inhabitants, and the

prejudice, like most prejudices, is founded upon actual ignorance of what the town is and of its population. There is doubtless some shadow of an excuse for this ignorance. When Johannesburg first attracted attention by its wonderful gold industry, certain names came prominently forward and gained notoriety, and they were taken by the British public as typical representatives of all the inhabitants. Most prominent amongst these was the name of Mr. Barnato. He was a self-made man, and the rapidity with which he acquired an enormous fortune, and the tales current as to many of the incidents of its acquisition, had a fascination for the public mind which caused him to be looked upon as a typical Johannesburger. As a matter of fact, he was a most exceptional one.

The most important section of the inhabitants of Johannesburg may be described as professional and business men of as good standing and as high a class as any to be found in the large manufacturing and commercial towns of Great Britain. It is doubtful whether there is any town in England or Scotland, except London itself, where there are collected so many eminent engineers, chiefly British, but many American, and some German and French. It is only natural that it should be so. The industry of the town and its vicinity is not cotton or wool or steel or iron, but gold, and the discovery of the localities where gold is to be found in paying quantities, and the working of the mines, render the services of the most eminent engineers essential; and the owners of gold mines can afford to pay for the best brains. What applies to the engineers applies also to the financiers, mine managers, accountants, surveyors, assayers, chemists, and others engaged in the industry, and the consequence is the presence in the town of

a numerous body of professional men of a high class. The skilled artisans necessary to attend to the machinery and to the work on the surface, as well as beneath it, are of a superior class, and are well paid and provided for. Few, if any, towns have a population where the general standard of intelligence is higher; and as in the past they declined to be ridden roughshod over by the Kruger oligarchy, so in the future they will demand the right of managing their own affairs. The town itself has only existed for seventeen years, and it is out and out the finest and best built town in South Africa, and its people are full of energy and enterprise; and, marvellous as has been its rise and rapid as has been its growth, it is certain that under good and uncorrupt government its progress will be still further accelerated, and that it has before it a splendid future.

The difficulties of granting representative Government immediately to the whole of the Transvaal or Orange River Colony are fully recognised. Though eventually, it is to be hoped, the Dutch and the Boers in the colony may be placed on exactly the same footing as the British, there must of necessity be an intermediate stage. Were the Boers now to be given the franchise on the same terms as the British, they would at once use it, not to carry on the Government, but to upset it. This has been the game of the disloyal Dutch in Cape Colony. Not content with having equal rights with the British in the colony, and unable to contend with them by physical force, they have utilised the franchise granted to them for the purpose of upsetting the Constitution under which they obtained their rights, and of supplanting the Power which gave them more consideration than any other Power in the world would have done. Safeguards must be provided so that such treason-

able pranks as have been played in the Cape Legislative Assembly are rendered impossible, and the providing such safeguards will take time; and the question the Colonial Office and Lord Milner have to consider is how to provide for government during this intermediate stage. As for Johannesburg itself, municipal government founded on a broad franchise might be given it at once, and its boundaries could be so arranged as to include the government of the Rand mines. Probably, with some variations in constitution, similar rights of self-government could be given to Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and other towns. Some towns have municipal government already; but it is under military supervision, and till the military element is discarded there can be no real self-government.

For Johannesburg large schemes for drainage, water-supply, and road-making, or, rather, mending, demand immediate attention, and they cannot be carried out without the expenditure of some £5,000,000. Two years' neglect of road-mending has left the chief thoroughfares in a deplorable state, and a very large sum will be required to put them in a proper condition. At present there is no system of proper drainage, and the establishment of one is essential, and a supply of water for what will be a rapidly-increasing population must be provided. On all these domestic matters they who bear the cost will wish to have a voice. But there is another question closely affecting the working of the mines, and also the carrying on of business in the town, which will demand immediate attention. This is the labour supply. For many reasons it is a delicate question, and bristles with difficulties; and unnecessary interference with it by the Mother Country might lead to serious harm, and should be strongly deprecated. Fortunately, Mr.

Chamberlain is all-powerful at the Colonial Office and on Colonial matters in the Cabinet, and he is a Minister after the Colonials' own heart. He is the only statesman of the first class who has made the Colonies his special study since Great Britain became a Colonial Power, and he has done more than any former Minister of the Crown to cement the union between Great Britain and her Colonies ; and not only in South Africa, but throughout the whole of our Colonial Empire, he is the most popular of our statesmen, and his is the name to conjure with. Lord Milner is equally popular as High Commissioner. His reception at home has shown how he is appreciated in England ; but the appreciation of him in South Africa is equally great, and nothing has given the Colonials more satisfaction than the honours which have been bestowed upon him by the King, the Government, and the City of London.

CHAPTER XII.

THE TREATMENT OF THE COLOURED POPULATION—
COLONIAL VIEWS.

THERE is an impression deep in the Colonial mind that most of the evils and disasters of the past would have been avoided had Colonial opinion been invited and Colonial advice adopted; and, robust as is their faith in Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner, it is not surprising that there should be a feeling of nervousness when such thorny questions as those affecting the coloured population come up for discussion and decision. The grave errors committed by the Mother Country in 1835 can never be forgotten. The evil consequences of these errors exist at the present moment, and are keenly felt. Had the Colonial Minister of that day listened to Colonial opinion, and not been guided by a few missionary zealots, there would have been no Boer trek and no Boer war. Nothing has estranged the Dutch so much from the British as the policy initiated by Lord Glenelg, under the influence of Dr. Philip, and in opposition to the views of the then Governor, Sir Benjamin d'Urban, and the Colonists. As to the motives which actuated Dr. Philip and his co-missionaries it is useless to inquire. They may have been the best in the world, or they may have been prompted by ambition. Their scheme was that the different States of coloured Africa should be ruled by native chiefs under the "guidance of missionaries," and that all Euro-

peans should be excluded from them who were "not favoured by missionaries." The result of the scheme of these spiritually-minded men would have been to place the whole temporal power in their hands. They would have been absolute and despotic rulers. The coloured chiefs in whose name they would have governed would have been mere puppets. The lesson taught by past history is that in temporal matters priests, presbyters, predicants, and ministers of religion generally are the worst possible rulers, and had the missionaries obtained their object the condition of South Africa would have been much worse than it even is. In trying to obtain it, however, they pandered to the coloured population, and hence the mistaken policy in Cape Colony with regard to them which has led to such great and serious evils. To introduce the same policy into the Transvaal and Orange River Colony hastily, without any consultation with or mandate from the Colonists, would be disastrous. Its chief effect would be to unite the loyal British with the disloyal Dutch against the British Government. This is no exaggeration. The feelings and views of the loyalists have not received much attention, either here or at home, by those in authority, and there is a deep feeling of resentment amongst them, and it would not take much to convert it into active discontent. The instances of the truckling of the British Government to the opinions of faddists and petty cliques of busybodies in their conduct of Imperial business were so numerous that the suspicions and forebodings of the Colonists can easily be understood.

The most glaring case, of course, is that which occurred in 1884, with regard to General Gordon, and the lesson gleaned from its frightful consequences cannot be too often rubbed into the minds of those who have in their hands

the management of the nation's affairs. If ever there was a hero, he was one ; and now that his life has been sacrificed to the views of a few unctuous faddists, this is the general opinion of all the British. In the spirit of the truest heroism, and with the most absolute disregard of his own life, he undertook the dangerous task of rescuing the Egyptian troops and officials and many Europeans from the clutches of the Mahdi, and if ever a General ought to have been allowed a free hand, and to choose his own instruments for the accomplishment of his task, it was this most gallant one. He knew the country he had to enter, and the people he had to deal with, and their manners and customs and ways of thought. To save the lives of those in peril he asked for the assistance of Zebehr Pasha. The request, or demand, as it should have been considered, was reasonable in itself, and so thought Lord Cromer, who was Consul-General in Egypt, and Lord Granville, who was then Foreign Secretary, and the whole of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, and they not only approved of it, but they notified their approval of it to the authorities in Egypt. Incredible as it may sound, these so-called statesmen all at once executed a complete *volte face*, and recalled their assent to General Gordon's request ; and the cause of their change of front was an objection raised by an irresponsible body called the Anti-Slavery Association, because, as they alleged, Zebehr Pasha had been a slave-dealer. Well might poor Gordon himself apply the term of "indelible disgrace" to the British Government ! And the results of their cowardly action were the murder of Gordon himself, the giving over to slavery of the most brutal kind of 11,000,000 of people, and the death through slaughter and famine of no less than 5,000,000. It is one of the blackest pages in the

history of the last century. Unknowingly, no doubt, but still most certainly, this society with the avowed object of suppressing slavery, and the Ministry which truckled to it, did more to increase and prolong slavery than have done all the slave-dealers of Central and East Africa. This society still exists, and it has never shown by any act that it has repented of the serious crime it committed, and its members, and others of a kindred spirit and with the same pretensions, press forward to influence and hamper the Government in their actions. The object they pretend to have in view is excellent ; but the means they take to attain it are begotten of ignorance and lack of experience, and defeat it ; and what is wanted is a statesman who has the courage to say so and to defy their attempts to influence him.

The British Colonists are no more cruel than are their countrymen at home, and their wish is to deal fairly with the coloured people ; but in their dealings they wish the lessons of practical experience to be attended to. In times past the treatment of slaves by some of the Dutch was revolting, and the manner in which the Boers of the present day treat the Kaffirs is often cruel and always degrading. The British in South Africa have no wish to countenance cruelty or degradation, and, in fact, they have as great an abhorrence of both as have the philanthropists at home. But though they have no desire to tyrannise over the coloured people, they are determined not to be tyrannised over by them, and hence their opposition to measures advocated by some missionaries and faddists. That Kaffirs and the coloured people generally are capable of some kind of civilisation is certain ; but to what extent their civilisation can be carried is still uncertain. Their besetting sin

is one not unknown in civilised communities. It is idleness; and with their lovely climate, gorgeous sunshine, and every atmospheric temptation to indulge in *dolce far niente*, it is not to be wondered at. From time immemorial there have only been two punishments which have deterred them from indulging in idleness or committing crimes—death and torture. When British jurisprudence is firmly established throughout the land there will be no penalty of death without a fair trial, and torture will be abolished; but to abolish corporal punishment altogether, and to replace it by punishment suitable enough in a civilised country like England, would be disastrous, and would eventually be the cause of bloodshed and a cruelty arising from reaction. That there should be regulations with regard to corporal punishment, and safeguards against cruelty, and means taken which would prevent every employer of labour from flogging his own nigger according to his own sweet will, is most proper; but the making and carrying into execution of these regulations should be left to the Colonists themselves—at least, nothing should be done till they have been consulted, and till their voice has been heard. They have experience, and to act without experience in this, as in other matters, is most hazardous. The object of all should be to raise the Kaffir and to endeavour to develop his intelligence. At present, compared with the white man, he is a child, and the most humane policy is to treat him as such. Kind treatment is by no means thrown away upon him. He appreciates it and is grateful. The principle upon which Dr. Arnold acted in dealing with boys at a public school applies to them equally. Fear must come before affection. If they are afraid of their master, and the latter treats them kindly, they become strongly attached

to him. Like the Rugby boy who remarked of the present Archbishop of Canterbury that " Temple was a beast, but a just beast," they appreciate justice. There is no more chance of the coloured people being cruelly treated by the British colonists in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony than there was of Rugby boys being so treated by either Dr. Arnold or Dr. Temple ; but just as these two model head masters would not brook interference from ignorant outsiders without any experience, so the Colonists cannot be expected to pay attention to the whims and fancies of a few faddists who have never been in South Africa, and who know nothing of the coloured races, except what they have gathered from reading fancy missionary narratives. For the working of the gold mines coloured labour is necessary, and nobody gains more by it than the coloured labourers themselves. Compare the state of semi-barbarism in which they live under their native chiefs and the care taken of them and the comforts provided for them in the compounds in which they live when engaged in labour at the mines, and their gain in giving up a life of sloth for one of work and industry is apparent. The mine owners and mine managers have treated them well in the past, and they may be trusted to do so in the future, without any fussy interference from home.

For the working of the mines now open in the Rand no fewer than 150,000 coloured labourers are required, and when work is in full swing and new mines opened more will be necessary ; and how to obtain a proper supply will tax the ingenuity of those who want them. The best workers come from the East Coast, and, unfortunately, are under Portuguese authority. Friendly as are the relations between Great Britain and Portugal, and desirous as the King

and his people are to be on good terms with us, the Portuguese officials at Delagoa Bay cannot resist the temptation of making money out of the coloured people under their jurisdiction, and place all kind of obstacles in the way of their leaving the country, which obstacles can only be removed by cash payments down. This and other difficulties have to be surmounted before a regular and steady supply of labour can be obtained ; but the Colonists, if left to themselves, will undoubtedly surmount them. The chances are that accustoming the coloured population to regular and consecutive labour will be the best means of civilising them, and preparing them for adopting the principles and practice of Christianity.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE GOOD AND EVIL RESULTS OF MARTIAL LAW.

OUT of evil good often comes, and amongst many of the advantages which the Empire at large will reap from the experience gained by the war in South Africa none will be greater than that which entails, not only upon South Africa, but upon all the British dominions beyond the seas, the necessity of forming and keeping up a large and efficient Volunteer force.

The Anglo-Saxon race has always had a distrust of standing armies, and though in Great Britain there has been a standing army since the Restoration, it has been so fenced round with securities, especially by the necessity of passing the Army Act annually, that it has in no way threatened the supremacy of the civil power. This distrust of standing armies arose from the fear of their being used to support the despotic powers of monarchs, as they often have been in Europe and elsewhere, and not from any deficiency in military spirit. This spirit, chiefly allied as it is with that love of sport which is one of the leading characteristics of our race, is as strong as it is in any nation. It is quite distinct from what is called militarism. Recently a society has been formed with the avowed object of checking the spirit of militarism, which its members think has so increased of late that it threatens to become dominant, and so to interfere with the liberty of the subject. Were there any grounds for this fear this society might do useful work ; but

at present the danger of military supremacy at home is so remote that few people will think that it comes within the range of practical politics. In South Africa it has had, and at the present time is having, a trial, and I am bound to admit that the experience learnt from it in a great measure justifies the apprehensions felt by the founders of this new society. If they want converts they could not do better than send some representatives to Johannesburg. There militarism is rampant, and however much some of the military may be enjoying themselves under, or perhaps over, it, its beneficent sway is not appreciated by the civilians.

For some special reasons, inexplicable to the lay mind, but doubtless clear enough to our military rulers, Johannesburg, and, I believe, Pretoria also, appears to have been selected as the *corpora vilia* upon which to try the severest operations of the working of what is called martial law. The somewhat contradictory definition of martial law is that it is "not a law in the proper sense of the term at all," and, as a text-book which has been "confidentially" distributed to officers states, "it follows that for the most part what is done under martial law is illegal, and that under normal conditions both those who order and those who execute martial law operations are liable for the consequences." The text-book referred to is a very good one, and it was circulated throughout Cape Colony, being issued "by order," and signed "G. K. Cockerill, Captain, D.A.A.G., Cape Colony District." It points out to those who have to act under martial law that their only protection is a Statute of Indemnity, and it informs them that "unless the administration of martial law has been grossly unreasonable and irregular, it may safely be assumed that such a statute will always be passed. Those who administer

martial law need not therefore fear to act promptly and boldly in all matters necessary for the preservation of peace, or to frustrate the operations of an enemy; *but they should be careful to confine their exercise of arbitrary power to acts directed to the attainment of these objects, and reasonably likely to ensure them.*" The italics are those in this text-book.

Whether a similar "confidential" text-book has been circulated in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony I cannot say; but most probably it has, and if it has not been, it ought to have been. Martial law has been now proclaimed throughout the whole of South Africa, and in the opinion of many Colonials who know the country well it would have been better if it had been proclaimed sooner—practically as soon as hostilities commenced. Its proclamation, on the whole, has had most beneficial effects. In many parts of the country where sedition was rife, and where treason stalked about with unblushing audacity, the military commandants have, by their firm and just administration, checked sedition, and have practically stamped out treason, or, at least, made it hide its head for fear of condign punishment; and the greatest credit is due to them. Theirs has been in many respects a most difficult and thankless task; but they have performed it admirably, punishing the guilty and at the same time earning the respect and gratitude of all the respectable and loyal civilians. While they have displayed energy and determination in routing out the disloyal subjects of the King, they have been conciliatory to, and shown all consideration for, those who were known to be loyal. In Kimberley, though surrounded by Boers, Mafeking, Bulawayo, and throughout Rhodesia, as well as in Natal, and many parts of Cape

Colony, a stranger would scarcely know that he was living in districts where martial law had been proclaimed. Why Johannesburg has been made an exception it is difficult to explain, except that those here in authority are Little Englanders and pro-Boers, and therefore in league with the enemy and the little Welsh clique in the House of Commons, with a desire to punish its inhabitants for what they consider its past sins. Unfortunately, the action of the military authorities in the town has caused a bitterness of feeling and resentment which would have been dangerous but for the advent of Lord Milner. Soon after his departure for England on his well-earned holiday a rule was promulgated, under martial law, that no civilians except those holding certain appointments were to be out of doors between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Officers in uniform were exempted, and were allowed to roam about all night at their own free will.

This distinction was considered invidious; for if the State was in such danger as to necessitate this drastic regulation, it was considered by the general public that military and civilians alike should feel its inconvenience. The Rand Rifles especially felt this. Their position is peculiar and their corps unique. Membership of it is compulsory, and all able-bodied British subjects in Johannesburg are compelled to join it. They have to be drilled and to learn to shoot and pass as efficient, and they are liable to be called out at any time and at all hours of the night, if the wily Boers should take it into their heads to make a nocturnal visit to the town. There is this distinction between them and the officers and men of the Regular Army: they get no pay. Amongst their members are all the professional men and men of wealth and business in the town, as well as their

butlers and other men servants. In brain power they might not excel the "Devil's Own," famous for the Judges and King's Counsel who have belonged to it, or in taste the Artists' Corps; but in general intelligence they would equal them, and in that much-preached-against qualification, wealth, they would probably be able to buy up both. They were relied upon by the military authorities to defend the town against the enemy; but at first they were not to be trusted out after 10 p.m., and subsequently the regulation was relaxed till twelve. But still there is the invidious distinction between them and Imperial officers. The rule itself is absolutely useless for the purposes for which it is alleged it was made—viz., to prevent communication between the Boers in the town and those without, and to prevent goods being exchanged between them. Had it been made to apply to all persons between the time it is dusk and the time it is light—that is, say, between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.—it might have had some effect; but even that is very doubtful. As it is, it is a useless interference with the liberty of the civilians, and, bad as this may be, it is not nearly so bad as the manner in which the regulation has been enforced. If the allegations with regard to this are true, there ought most certainly to be an inquiry into the matter, and those who are responsible should be brought to book. Rule No. 27 of the text-book from which I have already quoted says: "For minor offences under Martial Law Regulations the offender will not necessarily be arrested, but may be summoned to appear before the Commandant or other officer deputed by him, or before the magistrate acting as his deputy. For any offence (under the said regulations) of a more or less serious character the offender may be arrested—(a) Generally upon a warrant from the magistrate acting as deputy of the Com-

mandant, or upon the written order of the Commandant ; (b) without such warrant or written order in cases of special gravity or urgency." These instructions are what they ought to be ; but, unfortunately, in Johannesburg they have not been acted upon. They have been entirely ignored. Numbers have been arrested without any written order or warrant for being out of doors after 10 p.m.—in some cases it has been only a few minutes past—taken to the police station, all bail refused, and compelled to spend the night in a police cell. Next morning they have marched through the streets with other prisoners, accused of all kinds of crimes, to the magistrates' court, and there punished by the imposition of a fine.

The refusal of bail is the gravest matter. According to the spirit of British law and justice, nobody ought to be punished until he is convicted. Prisoners are detained in prison before conviction, not by way of punishment, but merely to secure their presence before the proper tribunal. If that presence can be secured without the necessity of imprisonment, it should be, and bail should always be allowed where it is known that those offering it will secure the appearance of the prisoner at the proper time before the proper tribunal. In the cases which have occurred in Johannesburg, when bail has been refused, there has been no question as to those arrested not appearing. In many cases they have been well-known people, and they have been prepared to put down larger sums for bail than they would possibly have been fined. Why bail was refused it will be impossible to say correctly without an inquiry. The officer in command of the police was informed that orders had been issued to him and to other officers to allow bail in no cases, and he added that though he and others dis-

approved of the orders, they were obliged to carry them out. It is said, also, that an officer in high command in the police had said that it was "a good thing to refuse bail, as many of the people in Johannesburg would not mind a fine, but they would not like a 'night in chokey.'" Whether this latter statement is perfectly accurate I cannot say; but from what I have seen and heard the probabilities that it is so are strong. Of course, all these acts are illegal; but the question which the Government at home should consider is whether they were so wrong, not to say brutal, in themselves that those who were responsible should be excluded from the benefits of the Bill of Indemnity, which, as a matter of course, will eventually be passed.

In my judgment there certainly ought to be an investigation, so that the military authorities in question may have an opportunity of explaining their conduct, and the irritation of British subjects in the colony be thus allayed. The irritation is intense. There is a deep felling of dislike and annoyance on the part of the loyal portion of the population against the military authorities in the colony, and under certain circumstances it might become dangerous. It is not uncommon to hear citizens wishing for the return of the days when Kruger ruled, as a result of what they have to put up with at the hands of those placed in brief authority here. The great object which Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner, and the whole of Lord Salisbury's Government, as well as the whole British nation, have at heart is to draw more closely the ties which unite the Mother Country to this and other colonies, and to increase as much as possible good feeling and friendship between them, whereas the conduct of a few military officials here has been such as to mar as much as possible this laudable object.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE UNBUSINESSLIKE METHODS OF THE MILITARY AND
THE MISMANAGEMENT OF THE RAILWAYS.

CERTAIN of the regulations which are supposed to be made for the detection of the enemy are very irritating to those who ought to be considered friends—loyal civilians—and it is hard to see their utility. To ride in a carriage, or on horseback, or even a bicycle, a “permit” is necessary, and those riding or driving are bound to show it whenever it is demanded by the military policemen. In a distance of six or seven miles it often has to be shown three or four times. Business men driving to the mines some few miles off are stopped several times and compelled to show their permits, though the policemen know them perfectly well. The object of the rule is to catch a Boer. This never takes place. The policemen themselves—a very fine body of men, recruited mainly from the Grenadiers and Coldstreams—will tell you that they stop daily thousands of Englishmen, but scarcely ever, if ever, a Boer. They know, as they have often told me, the difference between British and Dutch; but they will tell you, apologetically, and in the manner of thorough gentlemen, that they have no discretion, as they must act according to their orders. They admit the absolute uselessness of the regulation for its avowed object, and one of them I heard say that it was “only made to annoy the public.” This is the opinion of most of the British subjects

in Johannesburg, and it does not increase their affection for the military officers who have been placed over them.

The regulations with regard to railway travelling and manner in which they are carried out are equally irritating, and apparently equally useless if the object is to entrap the Boer. Everybody who travels must have a written permit, and there are valid reasons which make such a document necessary. The irritating part comes in when he has got it; for on his journey he is not only constantly called upon to show it, far oftener than a person is required to show his ticket at home on the most exacting lines, but it is often taken away from him altogether, with the object of being looked at, and then given back; but the unfortunate part is that it is occasionally lost or given to the wrong person. The journey from Johannesburg to Pretoria takes about two hours, and people would like to go in the morning and return in the evening. Before arriving at Pretoria the permit is demanded and taken away, and the deprived is told he will have to call for it at the permit office in Pretoria. If he asks where that important place is, the intelligent sergeant who takes his permit will probably tell him that he does not know, but that anybody will tell him. The time taken to find the place is serious to a busy man, and in one case I know of a man of very large business had to wait over an hour before the juvenile officer in charge could see him and hand him back his permit; and in another case the permit had been sent to the wrong place, and after much telephoning another permit was graciously granted. The result of the Pretoria mode of doing business is that passengers who want to go for the day have to stay the night, and the only gainers are the hotel keepers.

Great, however, as are the inconveniences caused by

the military unbusiness-like manner of dealing with permits, the annoyance caused is not so great as that caused by the behaviour of many of the military railway officials. The complaints of their arrogance, impudence, and impertinence are constant. Many of the R.S.O.'s—that is, Railway Staff Officers—probably by far the largest number of them, perform their work in the pleasant and cheery manner which is characteristic of the British officer at home; but some do not; and it is concerning these latter that people grumble. Complaints of overbearing rudeness are too common, and there is no doubt that there is good ground for them. The dignified and exalted position of station-master seems to have had a most deleterious effect on the character and conduct of some officers. We all know what an important personage the “Chef de Gare” is in France, and how he struts about the station with an air of importance worthy of the cock which is the national emblem; but he pales before some of the soldiers who have been appointed to a similar position in the new colonies. If any justification of these complaints is wanted let inquiries be made at Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. There is doubtless great excuse to be made for the incapacity of these impromptu-made railway officials, and it would almost be a miracle if they could do their work properly. Railway officialdom requires special training, and to expect a captain to make a good stationmaster and a lieutenant a good ticket collector is requiring too much of our military men; but the question is, Why employ military men at all, instead of civilians, who would, of course, have to be under military control? The military themselves complain of the work, and say it is awful drudgery, and the only reason they take it is because they get a little more pay with it. Officers

in command say they cannot get a good class of officer to undertake the work, and therefore they have to appoint those whom their brother officers describe as "rotters." Whatever the cause, the result is not pleasant for the public, and the sooner military railway officials are replaced by civilians the better they will be pleased. Were Mr. Brod-rick to get the same Committee who have inquired into the War Office and its mode of conducting business to inquire into the military management of railways and of civil government generally, their report would most certainly be in some such terms as these: "The system pursued is one calculated to inflict the smallest possible amount of injury upon the enemy and to give the greatest possible amount of annoyance to friends, and it is so cunningly arranged that it is impossible to fix responsibility upon any individual." That the loyalists in the Transvaal should be disheartened and chagrined at the treatment they have received at the hands of some of the military is not surprising. It would be very surprising if it were not so. At a recent social gathering an eminent King's Counsel composed and read the following lines:

I've passed thro' lands, 'neath southern skies, where British flags
yet gleam
O'er Uitlanders, a starving crowd, with Boer and Black supreme,
Where Treason lost in fight the game, but Traitors won the
day,
And Loyalists learnt the bitter truth that loyalty does not pay.

The lines are not by the Poet Laureate or Rudyard Kipling; but they truthfully express public feeling in the Transvaal. The annoying part is that the conduct of a few officers charged with civilian duties—comparatively very few—should undo so much of the good work which has been done by the Army at large. The private soldiers of the

Imperial Army, familiarly called "Tommies," are extremely popular with the loyalists, and though now, for the first time in the last twenty years, they are feared by the Boers, they are also respected and liked by them, and especially by the Boer ladies. The same may be said of the regimental officers. Their daring in action, contented and good humoured endurance under great hardships and privations, and merciful humanity in the hour of victory are fully recognised and appreciated as well as is the work done by a number of officers who toil all day at irksome official work. It is the conduct of only a few which has caused discontent; but this conduct affects the whole population, and hence the necessity of calling attention to it. It would have been thought that loyalty would have been a quality highly prized by officers holding high commands in the King's Army; but this does not seem to be the case in South Africa. On two occasions since his appointment as Governor and High Commissioner has Lord Milner left the country for a brief holiday, and on each occasion has he delegated his power to a General of the Army, and under the sway of both of them have the loyal portion of the population received a cold douche, which they have found anything but pleasant.

There is no more highly educated officer in the British Army than Sir William Butler; yet no sooner had Lord Milner turned his back upon Capetown than he, as Acting-Governor, for some inscrutable reason snubbed the loyalists to such an extent that he was recalled, and his conduct made him very unpopular in England. Lord Kitchener has done, as is well known and fully recognised, excellent work for his country in his military capacity in Egypt, and it is difficult to say how far he should be held answerable for the acts of his subordinates here. His work as General-in-

Chief must be hard and engrossing enough, and if, as is said, he is one of those hard-working Generals who will attend to all details himself, he can have little time to devote to the civilian affairs the management of which has been delegated to him by the High Commissioner. He, however, is held to be responsible, and the consequence is that he is as unpopular as was Sir William Butler. This is much to be deplored, and the lesson to be laid to heart for future guidance is that high military qualifications do not necessarily fit those who possess them for the administration of civil affairs.

CHAPTER XV.

SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SELF-DEFENCE—HOW THE
ARDOUR OF COLONIAL VOLUNTEERS HAS BEEN DAMPED.

MANY of the incidents referred to in the previous chapter have done much to strengthen the desire of the Colonials to have a large and strong Volunteer force, and the formation of such must benefit both the Mother Country and the Colonies alike. All Colonials have a passionate love for independence and a firm belief in self-government; but these blessings cannot rest on a firm foundation unless those who possess them are prepared to defend them at the risk, if need be, of their lives. Self-government implies self-defence. It is to be hoped that the Colonies may have no wars for generations to come; but the best way to prevent such a catastrophe is to be prepared for defence in case of attack. The formation of Volunteer regiments will not only do this, but it will benefit the population in many other ways. There can be no doubt that the German nation has improved greatly, both physically and morally, in consequence of the discipline they have been subjected to under conscription. The Anglo-Saxon race does not favour conscription; it interferes too much with the liberty of the subject. Fortunately, as great, if not greater, advantages can be gained under the Volunteer system. In Great Britain the Volunteer force was the offspring of the people themselves, and for years it received no encouragement from the different Governments, and it was a source

of supreme ridicule to members of the Regular Army and Militia. In spite of ridicule and "chaff" it persevered and established itself, and it is now a permanent force, whose great value is recognised by the Government at home as well as by all foreign Powers.

The Colonies will do likewise ; in fact, in a great measure they have done so already. Canada has a fine Army, founded on the Volunteer principle, and Australia, having had a small one, is now increasing it largely and taking every means to make it efficient. Cape Colony has always had its Mounted Rifles, and a finer type of soldier does not exist anywhere ; and now the Town Guard, which came into existence in consequence of the recent Boer invasion, is to be incorporated permanently, and to be called the Cape Peninsula Regiment. Natal has shown what her Volunteer forces can do during the war, and the dash and bravery displayed by her citizen soldiers prove that she has good material out of which to manufacture a strong Volunteer force. In Rhodesia the Volunteer spirit is running strong, and last June Mr. Rhodes laid the foundation-stone of a new drill hall which is to cost £12,000, and in his address to the Volunteers he pointed out that the greater their number the fewer mounted police would be required, and therefore the less would be their taxation. In the Transvaal the same spirit is in full swing, and it has received considerable impetus from the action of Lord Kitchener. His refusal to guard the mines or to hold himself responsible for their safety called into existence the Mine Guards ; and they are a fine body of men, and already have done excellent service. They number some 1,500, and practically all the mines are guarded by them. The owners of the mines can say with truth that they now bear

the whole burden of defending their own property, and that they are in no way beholden to the troops of the Mother Country. They pay the members of the guard 5s. a day, and provide food, lodging, and uniform for them. Their duties are onerous enough. Many of the mines have to be fortified. These fortifications are composed of earth-works and sand bags, and mines filled with dynamite and connected to an electric cord, are placed around. Guards have to take their turn every night, and many of the guard sleep every night in the engine or other machinery rooms. The Boers often threaten an approach at night, but they are always driven off, and what they dread most are the dynamite mines, whose whereabouts are not known to them. The unknown has generally more terrors than the known, and especially for very ignorant people, which most of the Boers are. It has been said that there have been doubts expressed as to whether the Mine Guards will be entitled to the war medal ; but it sounds incredible, as they have all done hard military work, and by guarding the mines have released a large number of Imperial troops, who have been utilised elsewhere. They have rendered as great services to the Empire as any of the Volunteers or Regulars. The Rand Guards are a much larger body, numbering between 4,000 and 5,000, and they will supply material for making a fine fighting force. Unfortunately, with regard to these and other Volunteers mistakes have been made by certain of the military authorities which tend to discourage volunteering ; but the chances are that when these authorities depart, and the country is handed over to civil government, the evils they have caused will follow them, and not remain as memorials of their misgovernment and incapacity.

With regard to the Rand Rifles, the military authorities

wished to make membership compulsory, and they actually revelled delightedly at the idea of introducing conscription, and, in their vanity, they thought their action might prove to be the thin end of the wedge which would eventually influence the Mother Country. A draft proclamation embodying this principle was, I believe, sent home, when it quickly received its quietus, and the organisation of the corps was settled by two proclamations, the latter of which amended and superseded the former. Contract was substituted for conscription, and in theory it looked perfect, but in practice it has not made much difference. Nobody can enter Johannesburg without a permit, and the issue of these permits was made conditional on the receiver of one signing a document by which he binds himself to serve in the Rand Rifles. None but British were allowed to join the force, and the result of this restriction was that many Americans and Germans of a superior class, and perfectly loyal to Great Britain, were prevented from joining, whilst a good many "undesirables" are compelled to be drilled with genuine volunteers who do not much appreciate their company. Had recruiting been left to volunteering and not made compulsory, and had there been no prohibition against other nationalities joining, the corps would have been a finer one than it is, and there would have been no discontent. Fortunately, the Imperial officers told off to command and drill them are of an excellent class, and they are very popular. They not only understand their military duties well, but in the performance of them they show plenty of tact and *savoir faire*.

Another action of the authorities in Johannesburg has done much to damp the ardour of volunteering, and it seems impossible to justify it. Some time ago a very fine regiment

of Volunteers was formed at Cape Town, under the name of the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles. It attracted to its ranks the best class of recruits, and the reason of the attraction was that they were told they would be taken to Johannesburg and after serving six months there be disbanded. When the six months elapsed many applied for their discharge, and they were told that discharge was not the same as disbandment, and that if they took their discharge they would have to leave Johannesburg and go to the Coast. It is impossible to exaggerate the bitterness of feeling which has been caused by this discreditable quibble. It is considered a distinct breach of faith, and there are numbers now, who have taken their discharge in the country, nursing their resentment against the military authorities, while those who remain only do so by compulsion; and it cannot be said that this treatment increases their loyalty. The excuse given for this breach of faith by one of the commandants has made the matter worse; for it is reported that he said he could not do with five or six hundred men in the town loose on his hands. Considering that the men are all men of good character, and that they had served their country well for months, the suggestion was ungracious, and only added insult to injury.

There can be no doubt that such conduct on the part of two or three individuals tends to make volunteering unpopular, and many in their anger say they will have no more to do with it when compulsion is withdrawn. I anticipate just the contrary. When compulsion goes, the individual whose acts and words are complained of will have gone too, and under a sound civil administration the civilians will be found to flock eagerly enough to the colours which will be the badge of their independence.

Those in power and with influence should do all they can to encourage the movement. Volunteering should be made pleasant and agreeable and companionable. Men should be taught to shoot and ride and do a certain amount of drill, and all their expenses should be paid and liberal prizes be offered for efficiency and for excelling. Little Bulawayo has set a good example. The buildings, of which the drill hall is to be the chief feature, will also have a gymnasium, with billiard, reading, and smoking rooms, and perhaps a swimming bath. Club life can play an important feature in a Volunteer army if properly conducted. Sociability when off duty need not interfere with discipline when on duty. General Sir Edward Brabant is a pattern Volunteer commander, and he was always strict on duty and very free and easy with his men off. The consequence was that he had a splendid force always ready to do their work, and with them he was extremely popular.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE NEED FOR A LARGE COLONIAL VOLUNTEER FORCE,
AND THE RESTORATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

THE sooner a good Volunteer force is formed the sooner will the Imperial troops be allowed to return home. The majority are very anxious to return but it is to be hoped that many will remain and make a permanent home in South Africa. In forming a Volunteer army there may be some difficulties at first with regard to returned burghers and foreigners; but they will not be insuperable. Many Imperial officers will doubtless be ready to take adjutancies, and it is to be hoped that good selections will be made. There is not a little anxiety amongst the loyalists as to future appointments. Up to the present they themselves have received nothing like their proper shares, while pro-Boers and mugwumps have received what is considered much more than they deserve. The conferring of a C.B. on Colonel Frank Rhodes has given great satisfaction—for two reasons: first, because he is popular and deserved it; and, secondly, because it shows that connection with the Raid is not to be considered an unpardonable sin. Whatever errors of judgment he made with regard to that, he has suffered more than enough for them, and during the whole trying time he never lost heart, but by his conduct put heart into the others. At Ladysmith, it is acknowledged by all who were there, he was the

Mark Tapley of the place—always cheerful, ever ready to go and tend and cheer the sick and wounded, and by his own magnetic cheeriness compelling others to be cheerful and sanguine of ultimate success. His example did a vast deal of good in the besieged town, and the recognition of it by the Government is taken as an indication that they do not intend to ignore all loyalists in the future as, to a great extent, they have done in the past.

The loyalty of the loyalists has, as I mentioned in a former letter, been severely strained by some of the military in power as well as by certain actions of the civil power. A letter which appeared in the *Daily Mail* of July 27 gave an account of their feelings, and it in no way exaggerated them. As a matter of course, the paper was "censured" here, and not allowed to appear for fear of corrupting the minds of the loyalists, or, perhaps, the disloyalists. The "censorship" of the Press has much to answer for in this war. The avowed object of "censorship" is to prevent the enemy obtaining information which might be of use to them. For this purpose it is absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, in the present war it has been used for many different purposes, and chiefly to gull the British public and to keep them in the dark. The Press is apt to boast of its power; but during this campaign it has been practically impotent. It had much more power fifty years ago. During the Crimean War the *Times* was a real power in the country, and the letters of its distinguished correspondent, Sir William Russell, had an authority which was felt in all quarters, and which led to immediate reforms affecting the well-being of the soldiers and even in the conduct of the campaign. Had such freedom of writing been allowed in South Africa many reputations might have been

smashed, and some would-be heroes would not have loomed so largely in the public eye ; but many disasters would have been avoided and the war probably finished months ago. Human nature, unfortunately, generally goes wrong unless there is some power which can make it feel responsibility, and the gagging of the Press and the suppression of truthful news, and the publication of false and misleading accounts of actions, have had the effect of diminishing, if not entirely doing away with, all feeling of responsibility on the part of those who have been in power, and have insisted on their own accounts of their own actions alone being made public. Parliament should insist on having an inquiry into the working of the Press censorship during the last two years in South Africa, that so material may be obtained which would guide them in reforming the present system.

Should the British Government, in accord with the wishes and suggestions of the Little Englanders, attempt to impose taxes upon the new colonies for the cost of the war, without the British subjects in these colonies having a voice in the matter, the loyalty of the loyalists would be strained to breaking point, and an error pregnant with danger to the Empire committed. The inhabitants of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony will have no objection to contribute a fair amount towards expenses ; but what they will insist on, and most rightly, is that they shall be consulted, and themselves decide the matter. No taxation without representation will be their time-honoured Anglo-Saxon motto. They know perfectly well that the war was not undertaken solely or chiefly on their account. As Lord Kimberley has candidly confessed that the fear of a rising in Cape Colony was the cause of Mr. Gladstone's igno-

minious surrender in 1881, so a fear of a similar rising in the same place has influenced the action of the present Government. In strict justice, Cape Colony should be called upon to contribute just as much as the two newly-annexed colonies. The real cause of the war was the safety of the whole Empire and British ascendancy in South Africa. As far as the Colonial Office is concerned, and the Foreign Office acting in concert with it, there is no cause, fortunately, to find fault. With the War Office it is quite different. Their fatuous policy and ignorance and crass obstinacy in declining to take, or be guided by, colonial opinion has caused the war to last twice as long as it should have done, and to cost double, if not more, as much as it ought to have done; and to try to make the Colonists responsible for this useless expenditure would be the height of unwisdom. There is no likelihood that Mr. Chamberlain or Lord Milner would sanction such a course; but, considering how the British public has been kept in the dark by the abuse of the powers of the Press censorship, it is well that they should make inquiries for themselves, and ascertain the truth. Ministers in their actions require the support of public opinion.

What is now most necessary is the restoration of civil government. Till that is restored there is no prospect of genuine business being started. It cannot flourish under a military régime. With civil government the present state of brigandage and unrest will continue. When there is a large Volunteer force in the country, and an example has been made of those who wreck trains and loot stores, brigandage will cease and trade and commerce will flourish.

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THE ARGUS PRINTING COMPANY, LIMITED, TEMPLE AVENUE
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
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